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INTRODUCTION
At a time when much progress has been made to eliminate govern-
mental obstacles to free trade,' policy makers have begun to focus on
the private trade barriers that may result from restrictive business prac-
tices. Quite naturally, they have turned to antitrust law in search of a
remedy. Indeed, well before completion of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, the Right Honorable Sir Leon Brittan, then Commissioner
in charge of the European Commission's Directorate General for compe-
tition policy, made an influential appeal to introduce antitrust law as an
i. The completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT has left a strengthened institu-
tional structure for the elimination of trade barriers, the WTO, and a number of treaties
dealing with specific areas, including industrial and agricultural goods, services, and intellec-
tual property protection. However, these treaties deal mainly with trade barriers imposed by
governments, not restrictive business practices. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, GAT Doc. No.. MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M. 1130 (1994) [hereinafter
Uruguay Round Final Act].
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element of the GATT system.2 However, a subsequently drafted code
appears to have scant prospects of adoption any time soon.3 The task of
agreeing on substantive rules is daunting, and many doubt whether it is
desirable.4 In the wake of this apparently overambitious project, two
lines of attack seem to be emerging, neither of which involve changes in
substantive law. One involves "positive comity" between national or
regional enforcement agencies. Such arrangements tend to facilitate the
ability of one enforcement agency to coax another into enforcing its
own laws.5 The other line of attack, purely unilateral, is to apply anti-
trust law extraterritorially. The U.S. enforcement agencies have em-
braced this line of action. This probably, reflects both a determination to
pursue an independent policy and, with regard to certain trading part-
ners, a tactical gesture designed to coax these countries', authorities to
adopt the presumably more attractive alternative of enforcing their own
laws. Thus, this second line of attack, which is the principal focus of
this note, in some instances "supplements" positive comity arrange-
ments.
The current U.S. policy is to apply the U.S. antitrust laws, not only
to conduct abroad that affects the U.S. domestic market, but also to
exclusionary conduct that impedes access of U.S. companies to foreign
markets. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
2. Rt. Hon. Sir Leon Brittan, A Framework for International Competition, Address at the
World Economic Forum (Feb. 3, 1992), cited in Edwin A. Vermulst, A European Practitio-
ner's View of the GATT System: Should Competition Law Violations Distorting International
Trade Be. Subject to GATT Panels?, WORLD COMPETITION, March 1993, at 5, 5.
3. A draft International Antitrust Code, designed to be adopted as a plurilateral agree-
ment under the auspices of the GATT (now WTO), was drawn up by a group of 12 experts
known as the International Antitrust Code Working Group. As the head of the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ has put it, "the problems of getting agreement world-wide on an interna-
tional antitrust code ... are just so overwhelming that it is hard to imagine this occurring in
the near term." Interview with Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (fall 1993), available in
WESTLAW, AMBAR-TP Database. The draft Code was greeted with skepticism at a
December 1993 committee meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in Paris. Antitrust Division Official, Predicts Scant Prospects qf
International Code, [11 Current Reports] INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 220 (Feb. 9, 1994).
4. See, e.g., Eleanor Fox, Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a Globalized World:
Why and How?, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 593 (1991) (offering an account of the pros and cons of
harmonization and leaning towards the cons).
5. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competi-
tion Laws, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991), 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991) [hereinafter EC-US Antitrust Cooperation Agreement]. For
references on the operation of this agreement, see Joseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterrito-
riality: Activism and Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353, 374 n.117 and 376 n.123.
This type of procedural arrangement may find worldwide, multilateral application within the
WTO. This is the subject of current work by S.J.D. candidate Werner'Zdouc at the University
of Michigan Law School.
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announced in 1992 that it would take action "against conduct occurring
overseas that restrains United States exports." 6 The Draft Antitrust En-
forcement Guidelines for International Operations (Draft Guidelines for
International Operations), jointly issued in October, 1994, by the DOJ
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), confirm this position.7 This
emerging unilateral U.S. policy has been advocated mainly in the con-
text of discussions concerning the trade imbalance with Japan.8
Another unilateral option to which the United States might turn is
the so-called "anticompetitive practices clause" of Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act. This alternative differs greatly from the extraterritorial
application of antitrust law. A comparison of the two alternatives serves
to highlight a number of traits in the antitrust option that call into
question its validity.
One can scarcely overemphasize the differences between the alterna-
tives provided by trade law and antitrust law. The relevant trade statute,
Section 301, institutes a process that requires the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive (USTR) to identify trade barriers and, in some instances, subject the
foreign power in question to the choice of either removing the barrier or
facing trade sanctions. The policy underlying Section 301 has been
referred to in the literature as "aggressive unilateralism." 9 It is said to be
"aggressive" because, unlike most other trade statutes, Section 301 is
primarily concerned with opening foreign markets rather than protecting
the U.S. domestic market.' ° It is "unilateral" because the targeted coun-
try has not agreed to be subject to the process. Despite this label, the
Section 301 process is not wholly unilateral. Countries subjected to it
ultimately chose whether to settle with the United States or face retalia-
6. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pub. No. 92-117, Justice Department Will Challenge Foreign
Restraints on U.S. Under Antitrust Laws 1 (Apr. 3, 1992) (unpublished press release available
from the DOJ and on file with author) [hereinafter DOJ Policy]. At the time of writing, the
Antitrust Division had brought one case of this sort since the 1992 announcement, which was
settled by consent decree. See United States v. Pilkington plc, Civil No. 94-345 (D. Ariz. filed
June 25, 1994); Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement (CIS), 59 Fed.
Reg. 30,604, 30,609 (June 14, 1994) [hereinafter Consent Decree]. For a discussion of
Pilkington, see infra part I.B.3.
7. Draft for Public Comment (October 13, 1994), reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 52,810 (Oct.
19, 1994) [hereinafter Draft Guidelines for International Operations].
8. As early as 1990, "the DOJ announced [that it would pursue claims against overseas
conduct so as to promote exports] at a press briefing concerning, significantly, the progress of
talks on the Structural Impediments Initiative with the Japanese." Lori B. Morgan & Helaine
S. Rosenbaum, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J.
192, 195 (1993).
9. See, e.g., AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1990).
10. Another aggressive trade statute is the Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, 19
U.S.C.S. § 3104 (Law. Co-op. 1993). This statute is in essence a sector-specific version of
Section 301 and is thus known as "Telecom 301."
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tion. If they choose to settle, they may bargain for acceptable terms of
settlement, they may implement those terms, and they may later chose
to breach them. By contrast, the extraterritorial application of antitrust
law does not allow for this type of foreign government input. Instead of
coercing other countries to regulate their businesses in a manner condu-
cive to foreign trade, the antitrust option skips over the intermediary of
the foreign government and operates to regulate directly those business-
es. Needless to say, when unilateral regulation of foreign conduct re-
places government-to-government coercion, this presents a novel situa-
tion in trade relations which takes aggressive unilateralism to new
heights. The analogy with the aggressive unilateralism of Section 301 is
perhaps somewhat strained, since the extraterritorial application of
antitrust law is ostensibly part of antitrust policy, not trade policy.
However, when antitrust statutes are deployed to promote export oppor-
tunities, the line between aggressive trade policy and the goal of pre-
serving a healthy, competitive environment for the sake of U.S. firms
and consumers begins to blur.
Aside from the distinction between government coercion and direct
regulation, the Section 301 and antitrust options also differ in their
propensity to reflect the foreign policy interests of the United States.
While action under Section 301 is at heart a political process, guided
largely by the discretion of the USTR, the antitrust remedy is a judicial
one, open to private litigants who may pursue their interests without
regard to the broader concerns of the United States. This feature, like
unilateral regulation, is not disturbing when the extraterritorial applica-
tion of antitrust law is seen as part of our national antitrust policy
because this policy is by design one in which private litigants act as the
primary enforcers. Yet, is such a design appropriate when the purpose of
the suit is to gain access to foreign markets? Is this not more properly
the subject of a foreign trade policy?
This note examines how the antitrust and trade law options operate,
with the two-fold purpose of providing some idea of their potential
effectiveness and also suggesting what limitations, if any, should be
placed on their use. Parts I and II analyze the mechanics of applying the
antitrust and Section 301 remedies to eliminate foreign trade-restrictive
business practices. In light of this discussion of how the two processes
work, Part III considers whether they are likely to get out of control and
suggests how they ought to be restrained. Part III finds that Section 301
is subject to a number of constraints that generally will keep its use
within reasonable bounds. The antitrust remedy, however, emerges as
more problematic. While it may fruitfully and reasonably be used to
promote U.S. exports in some instances, it is unclear whether the courts
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will keep private litigants from taking the remedy to lengths that would
be damaging to U.S. interests and to the development of international
law. Existing domestic law fails to offer sufficient guidance, and the
relevant international norms (should the courts even deem them within
the province of judicial cognizance) are far too open-ended. The danger
is not only that the United States will encounter diplomatic friction but,
worse, that some foreign powers will begin to exercise jurisdiction in a
similarly aggressive manner. Accordingly, Part III proposes a policy of
self-restraint. Such a policy could be explicitly adopted by U.S. enforce-
ment agencies, in hopes that this would influence private litigants and
the courts. A statement of policy adhered to in practice would send a
clear message to foreign powers. The word and deed of the United
States could in turn influence and evolve with the practices of other
states, and a reasonable customary norm might emerge.
I. UNILATERAL REGULATION: EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Constraints of the Judicial Process
This section will first deal with the jurisdictional constraints on
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, focusing on the rules
of prescriptive jurisdiction and the related doctrine of international
comity. These two gate-keeping devices are specifically designed to
address concerns about the appropriateness of the extraterritorial
application of laws. The next subsection will briefly examine a dif-
ferent type of constraint, namely, that foreign trade-restrictive busi-
ness practices may often be permissible under U.S. antitrust law. The
last subsection will note some conceptual difficulties that arise in
substantive analysis when our antitrust laws are applied extra-
territorially to conduct that restricts U.S. export commerce without
directly affecting U.S. consumer welfare. It should be noted in pass-
ing that the requirement of personal jurisdiction1" and the obstacles
11. The commercial contacts of a foreign company with the United States may be
sufficient to meet the in personam jurisdiction standard of minimum contacts set out in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). If the offending business
has a U.S. subsidiary, it may often be sued under an "alter ego" or agency theory. The first
case to announce the applicability of the alter ego theory to foreign antitrust defendants was
United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948). The DOJ reportedly favors the tactic
of naming as defendants the U.S. subsidiaries of offending businesses, suing on alter ego or
agency theories. Joseph P. Griffin, The Impact of Reconsideration of U.S. Antitrust Policy
Intended to Protect U.S. Exporters, WORLD COMPETITION, June 1992, at 5, 10; see also New
York State Bar Association, The Proposed Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to Foreign
Markets (Report of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section), WORLD COMPETITION,
Sept. 1991, at 143, 150.
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inherent in foreign discovery 12 and enforcement 3 may also present
12. According to Anne Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ, the "most formidable restrictions on the United States' ability to
prosecute offenses that occur outside U.S. borders arise not under our jurisdiction or substan-
tive law, but in connection with legal limitations on our ability to obtain foreign-located
evidence .... Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Address Before the World Trade Center Chicago Seminar on GATT
After Uruguay (May 16, 1994), in Department of Justice, U.S. Antitrust Policies in World
Trade 10 (May 16, 1994) (unpublished transcription available from the DOJ and on file with
author). Discovery is of course crucial in antitrust where so much turns on detailed factual
determinations involving information that is often difficult to locate even in the United States.
U.S. law and the relevant international law applied in domestic courts pose few obstacles to
foreign discovery. Though federal discovery rules do not specifically authorize courts to
compel disclosure of documents or other materials located abroad, the federal courts have
eschewed any categorical territorial limitations on discovery, preferring a rule-of-reason
approach similar to that used in the area of prescriptive jurisdiction. Spencer W. Waller, A
Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 109 (1993); Gary B.
Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'v INT'L Bus.
1, 48 (1992). Orders for foreign discovery are consequently often issued. Id. at 48.
The obstacles to foreign discovery are naturally to be found in the reticence or inability
of foreign courts or other foreign officials to cooperate. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATs), according to Anne Bingaman, provide "an effective means of cooperation for most
types of criminal investigation." Bingaman, supra, at 11. These treaties entail mutual commit-
ments for the domestic authority to obtain information requested by the foreign authority,
allowing disclosure of certain information otherwise confidential under domestic law. MLATs,
however, do not cover all antitrust suits (the United States Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
with Switzerland expressly excludes antitrust matters), and they are all limited to investiga-
tions in criminal cases. See Bingaman, supra, at 12. The existence of statutory provisions
safeguarding the confidentiality of information obtained by the U.S. antitrust agencies is
considered to be a principal obstacle to the expansion of the scope of existing MLATs.
Report on the Proposed International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 1994 A.B.A. SEC.
ANTITRUST L. & INT'L L. 6. These provisions preclude the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission from providing information to other nonfederal antitrust enforcers,
such as foreign antitrust authorities. Id. In an attempt to address this obstacle, Congress
recently passed the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994). This law allows U.S. federal antitrust authorities to enter into
mutual assistance agreements with foreign antitrust authorities. It permits the Attorney
General and the FTC to exchange antitrust evidence with foreign authorities in the context of
both criminal and civil investigations. Antitrust. information is to be provided to foreign
antitrust authorities "to determine whether a person has violated any of the foreign antitrust
laws ....I Id. § 2(1) (emphasis added). A number of types of antitrust evidence is, however,
excluded: evidence obtained in Hart-Scott-Rodino filings, evidence relating to matters before
a grand jury, and certain classified information. Id. § 5. Ironically, the original impetus for the
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act came in great part from the need -to
exchange information contained in Hart-Scott-Rodino filings. Remarks of Prof. Thomas
Kauper, January 1995. Nevertheless, the Act purports to open the way to bilateral agreements
that would greatly facilitate the international discovery process. However, some foreign
agencies may be reluctant, or lack authority, to enter into agreements providing for assistance
as far-reaching as that envisaged in the Act. For example, the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Communities recently declared void the EC-US Antitrust Cooperation Agreement, supra
note 5, in a case decided on August 9, 1994. Case C-327/91, French Republic v. Commission,
1994-8 E.C.R. 1-3641. The European Commission reports that, since the European Union
Member States have in essence not questioned the substance of the agreement, the Commis-
sion expects a similar agreement will be approved by the Council, thus allowing the mainte-
nance of cooperation between the European Commission and the U.S. antitrust authorities.
Court of Justice Cancels Act Whereby the Commission Concludes an Antitrust Agreement
with the United States, Without Disputing the Content of the Agreement - Commission
Expects Council Approval of the Agreement, EUROPE, No. 6291 (n.s.) Aug. 10, 1994, 42d
year, at 2, 3. Other knowledgeable observers are, however, not as sanguine about the pros-
pects for approval by the Council. They suspect that Member States will raise heretofore
latent substantive concerns about the agreement.
13. Foreign courts do not customarily enforce U.S. decrees concerning behavior in their
countries. See PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 1 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
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significant practical constraints. 14 These constraints are tributary to
policies distinct from prescriptive jurisdiction and comity and thus
cannot be expected accurately to reflect concerns about whether U.S.
laws should be applied extraterritorially. The same may be said for the
jurisdictional matter of foreign sovereign immunity, as well as the
substantive obstacles that may be raised by the act of state doctrine and
the government compulsion defense. Therefore these matters, though of
considerable practical relevance, will not be discussed here.
1. Jurisdictional Constraints
To address effectively private barriers in foreign markets, it would
have to be feasible to bring a case against the conduct of foreign nation-
als acting abroad. Prescriptive jurisdiction in such cases would be justi-
fied under the theory that the restrictive effect on U.S. exporters consti-
tutes an effect within U.S. territory. Judge Learned Hand, in the 1945
Alcoa case, noted in dictum that the U.S. antitrust laws reach cases
involving effects on exporters. 5 In 1982, Congress confirmed this view
with respect to all of the provisions of the Sherman Act and most provi-
sions of the Clayton Act.16 The 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act (FTAIA) states that these two laws apply to violations caus-
ing "injury to export business in the United States."' 7 Moreover, the fact
that the offending parties are foreign nationals is not in itself a bar to
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 238 (1978). Moreover, some countries
have enacted legislation prohibiting such enforcement. Griffin, supra note 11, at 10. There-
fore, enforcement abroad will largely depend on the presence of persons in the United States
that can be coerced. This is easy when defendant has a U.S. subsidiary. Otherwise, the judge
might look for assets that can be taken "hostage." AREEDA & TURNER, supra, 270. Judges
may be reluctant to do so because such practices would discourage investment in the United
States. The fact is, however, that the importance of the U.S. market offers great leverage in
enforcement. Even when businesses are not present in the U.S. market through subsidiaries,
they are often willing to comply with court orders so as to avoid having restrictions placed on
their access to the U.S. market.
14. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, on the other hand, has no application in
antitrust law. United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
15. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
(the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect domestic, import, and export commerce).
16. Some substantive provisions of the Clayton Act do not apply to practices restricting
U.S. export opportunities. In this regard, Areeda and Turner note that "Clayton Act § 2(a)
applies only to sales 'for use, consumption or resale within the United States.' Clayton Act
§ 3 is similarly limited, and § 7 concerns only those mergers with anticompetitive implication
in a 'section of the country.' " AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 234a.
17. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6(A) (1982). In light of the
1982 Act and previous case law, the general presumption that Congress did not intend its
laws to be applied extraterritorially has no currency in the area of antitrust law. See Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, __ U.S. __ , 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2918 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). For an argument that the general presumption is in any case out of date, see
Born, supra note 12.
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the prescriptive reach of the antitrust laws, though it may affect relief
and have some bearing on substantive analysis. 8
The constitutionality of the reach of the antitrust laws as prescribed
by Congress is not controverted among the courts and thus need not be
discussed here.' 9 As to international law, U.S. law allows that acts of
Congress may generally be applied by the courts in violation of interna-
tional norms,2 ° unless those norms emanate from treaties that are directly
applicable ("self-executing") and later in time.2 1 As there is no treaty
governing the prescriptive jurisdiction of antitrust laws, 22 international
law now presents no barrier, enforceable in U.S. courts, to the general
directive of the 1982 Act that antitrust laws apply to protect export
opportunities. (Nonetheless, international law may still be relevant
inasmuch as U.S. courts subscribe to the canon of interpretation that
U.S. laws should be construed where possible so as not to conflict with
international norms.)
23
18. See KINGMAN BREWSTER & JAMES R. ATWOOD, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSI-
NESS ABROAD 232-33 (2d ed. 1981) (court may be influenced by defendant's foreign
status).
19. Under the angle of federal-state relations, the Commerce Clause covers foreign
commerce, and the federal system has always been largely inclined toward federal rather than
state power in the context of foreign relations. As to civil liberties, it has been suggested that
Fifth Amendment due process considerations be used to limit the reach of U.S. regulatory
authority, but this has not occurred. For more recent analysis, see Lea Brilmayer & Charles
Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1217 (1992).
20. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115(l)(a) (1986); see also Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A
Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2287 n.54 (1991) (citing relevant cases).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 115(1)(a); see John H. Jackson, Status of
Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 320 (1992);
John H. Jackson, United States, in 7 UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 141, 161 (Francis G. Jacobs &
Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
22. Efforts to treat the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction by convention have been
limited. Sreenivasa, in his outline presented to the 1994 International Law Commission (ILC),
notes: "States have ... entered into formal or informal agreements to coordinate their
policies, promote their cooperation[,] and institutionalize responses governing exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. But most of these efforts had been limited in focus and others
remained largely persuasive." Extraterritorial Application of National Legislation Outline by
Mr. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao 71, 73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/454 (1994) [hereinafter Sreenivasa
Outline] (citing F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty
Years, 186 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 56-66 (1984-1Il); ALAN V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
(1983)). Mr. Sreenivasa mentions as international conventions touching on issues of extraterri-
toriality those relating to terrorism, extradition, drug-trafficking, and avoidance of double
taxation. He suggests that the ILC "need not commit itself for the development of a Conven-
tion on the subject," stating that "[elven a model law or a compilation of guiding principles
could contribute towards codification .... " Sreenivasa Outline, supra, at 85. His remarks
would seem to indicate just how far the international community is from adopting any sort of
general convention governing extraterritorial application of laws.
23. The theory is that Congress should be presumed to have acted in accordance with
Fall 1994]
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In summary, except for a few provisions of the Clayton Act which
probably do not apply extraterritorially,24 there is no doubt that the
Clayton and Sherman Acts will reach conduct abroad affecting U.S.
export opportunities. Debate arises rather as to how to apply a general
limitation provided by Congress, namely that the offending conduct
must meet the "effects test" prescribed in the 1982 Foreign Trade Anti-
trust Improvements Act; and whether, and how, limitations beyond the
effects test should be applied by the courts in the name of international
comity or law. These two issues are not in practice entirely separate, but
they are often treated by the courts as analytically distinct and will thus
be examined separately.
a. The Effects Test ("Direct, Substantial,
and Reasonably Roreseeable")
The 1982 Act limits coverage of foreign restrictive business practic-
es to cases where the effect of the offending conduct is "direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable .... ,,2' As this language is similar to
formulations used previously by the courts, 26 it is clear that the language
confirms the courts' assumption that the Sherman and Clayton Acts are
not intended to cover all conduct that has some traceable effect in the
United States; the source of the effect must not be too remote.27 It is
less clear whether the statutory language provides operative criteria to
determine what is too remote.28
As was the case under the previous formulations, the statutory test
has resulted in very few dismissals.29 If anything, the words "reasonably
international law, unless it clearly indicates otherwise. Restatement (Third), supra note 20,
§ 114. This rule is also known as the Charming Betsy principle, in reference to Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
law ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construc-
tion remains").
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(A)(1) (1988).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Hamburg-Ameritanishche Packet-Fahrtactien-Gesellschaft,
200 F. 806 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("direct and material effect"); Sumeyer v. Seven-Up Co.,
411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("substantial impact"); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 ("any effect that is not both insubstantial and indirect").
27. Barry E. Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing
Need for Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 222 (1982).
28. Id. at 222. Since it was known that the previous judicial formulations failed to supply
operative criteria, the likeness of the statutory language to these formulations might be taken
as indication that Congress did not intend to clarify where the line ought to be drawn between
direct effects and effects that are too remote.
29. See Russel J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities
Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799
(1992).
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foreseeable" make the statutory notion broader than the previous formu-
lations by eliminating any possible requirement of actual knowledge of
substantial effects on U.S. commerce, or intention to create such ef-
fects.30
b. International Law/Comity: the Reasonableness Test
("Balancing" or the "Jurisdictional Rule of Reason")
In response to the perception of many observers abroad and at home
that the effects theory had led U.S. antitrust laws to be applied a bit too
far "offshore," certain courts began to embrace what is sometimes
referred to in antitrust circles as a "jurisdictional rule of reason. ' 31 With
this approach the courts sought to limit jurisdiction, not by refining the
effects test, but rather by adding a separate inquiry as to whether exer-
cising jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the circumstances.32
There is no formula for deriving what is "reasonable" under the
reasonableness test. In a manner similar to the interest-balancing ap-
proach often used in U.S. domestic conflicts law, the judge must make
a reasonableness decision in light of a number of factors. Although the
factors vary,33 the constant is that they embrace the interests of the
plaintiffs and/or government in the suit, as well as the interests of others
affected by the relief contemplated, including the interests of defendants
in legal certainty 34 and the interests of foreign powers in regulating the
30. "The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended 'reasonably
foreseeable' to be an objective standard: 'The test is whether the effects would have been
evident to a reasonable person making practical business judgements, not whether actual
knowledge or intent can be shown.' " Griffin, supra note 11, at 6.
31. See, e.g., BREWSTER & ATWOOD, supra note 18, at 306.
32. This "reasonableness test" is presented in the Restatement (Third) as an affirmative
element of jurisdiction, dictated by principles of international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 20, § 402; SPENCER W. WALLER, ANTITRUST LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCE §5.06 (1993) (commenting that the Restatement (Third) adopts the approach of
Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883-84 (5th Cir.
1982)). Industrial Investment stated that:
[w]e ... disagree with the suggestion in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617
F.2d at 1255, that the question whether to entertain the suit is discretionary with
the trial judge. A decision not to apply the antitrust laws must be based on solid
legal ground; the question is one of interpreting the scope that Congress intended to
give the antitrust laws."
Industrial Investment, 671 F.2d at 884 n.7.
33. The most commonly cited sets of factors, all slightly different, are found in the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 403; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d
Cir. 1979).
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 403(2)(d) ("The existence of
justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation").
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offending conduct free of interference by the United States.35 Taking
such factors into consideration requires the judge to decide whether to
dismiss in light of U.S. interests connected with the effect that gave rise
to jurisdiction as well as the U.S. interests implicated by the undesirable
effect of exercising jurisdiction. The balancing process involved in the
reasonableness test essentially asks which effect is worse.36
The reasonableness test is criticized both for offering too little
guidance to the courts and for giving an improper role to the judiciary
in foreign policy. 37 More relevant for the purposes of this discussion,
however, is the fact that the test has led to few dismissals, 38 and where
it has done so, the U.S. interests were often de minimis and would not
have passed the effects test anyway.39 Moreover, certain circuits have
rejected outright the notion that U.S. courts should be cognizant of the
reasonableness test and have applied only the effects test.40 Since mini-
mum contacts may be aggregated on a nationwide basis for the purposes
of establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants,4 plaintiffs
35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 403(2)(h) ("The likelihood of
conflict with regulation by another state").
36. One court has said as much, describing the "balancing [reasonableness] test" as a
process that "weighs the impact of the foreign conduct on U.S. commerce against the
potential international repercussions of asserting jurisdiction." Dominicus Americana Bohio v.
Gulf & Western Ind., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); cited in Jack I. Garvey,
Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of
Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 484 (1992).
37. Garvey, supra note 36, at 484-86.
38. Weintraub, supra note 29, at 1812. Weintraub cites Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating "balancing tests [applied as a jurisdictional
matter in antitrust and securities cases] tend to deemphasize foreign sovereign interests and
almost never lead a court to decline jurisdiction"). Id. at 1812 n.74.
39. See Garvey, supra note 36, at 485. Nevertheless, there have been cases dismissed
under the reasonableness test in which U.S. interests were arguably more than de minimus.
See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Products Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., 810 F.Supp. 1116
(D. Colo. 1993).
40. Most notably the D.C. Circuit in Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgium World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). WALLER, supra note 32, § 5.08, notes that the
Second and Seventh circuits have also rejected balancing. He cites National Bank of Canada
v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981), and In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,
617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). Karl Meessen notes, however, that refusal to apply the
reasonableness test is not necessarily a commentary about the existence of a norm of reason-
ableness in international law. Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary
International Law, 78 AM J. INT'L L. 783, 801 (1984).
41. BREWSTER & ATWOOD, supra note 18, at 117.
The Supreme Court has noted, but had no occasion to consider, the constitutional
issues raised by the theory that a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction,
consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant's
contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the state
in which the federal court sits.
Id. at 130 (1993 Cumulative Supplement) (citing Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf
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can select venue in a circuit that rejects the reasonableness test, other
considerations concerning choice of venue permitting.
The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to consider the
reasonableness test in Hartford Insurance.42 As is explained below,
however, a majority of the Court chose to avoid the matter. Consequent-
ly, whether, and how, to apply the test remains a matter of dispute
among the circuits. The Hartford Insurance case is nonetheless of inter-
est because it reveals some general tendencies on the Court.
c. The Status of the Jurisdictional Rule of Reason
in the Supreme Court - an Implicit
"Thumbs-Down:" The Hartford Insurance case
The following account of the Hartford Insurance case refers to
points made in the DOJ's amicus brief that help to demystify somewhat
the reasoning of the majority on the Court.43
Twenty state attorneys general launched what was publicized as a
"nuclear attack" on the insurance industry in Califomia.44 A number of
insurers were charged with colluding to exclude from coverage the risk
of polluter liability. Among the defendants were three London-based
reinsurers which had allegedly coerced recalcitrant California insurers
into abandoning their pollution liability coverage by refusing to reinsure
them. The effect in the United States was the elimination of an impor-
tant type of insurance in the state of California through means of a
refusal to deal. This conduct was permissible both domestically and
internationally under United Kingdom law, which includes a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme for reinsurance. The policy interest at stake for
the United Kingdom was the viability of its reinsurance market, which,
it was argued, would be in jeopardy if its reinsurers exposed themselves
to the considerable amounts involved in polluter liability. The Ninth
Circuit, applying a reasonableness test under Section One of the
Sherman Act, found that "application of [U.S.] antitrust laws to the
London reinsurance market 'would lead to significant conflict with
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987), and Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)).
42. Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2891.
43. For an otherwise more detailed analysis of the case, see, e.g., David G. Gill, Interna-
tional Decisions: Antitrust - Extraterritorial Reach of Sherman Act - "Reasonableness" -
International Comity, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1994).
44. Stacy Adler, Drawing the Battle Lines: Activists Declare War on Insurers, Bus. INS.,
Aug. 8, 1988, at I (quoting former West Virginia Attorney General Charles G. Brown); see
also, Michael L. Weiner, Comity, Cooperation, and Keiretsu: Comments on Papers by
Davidow and Griffin, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1067, 1068 n.7 (1993).
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English law and policy' ,45 but concluded that the "express purpose [of
defendants] to affect United States commerce and the substantial nature
of the effect produced" weighed more heavily in the balance.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide, among other things,
whether the appellate court had properly allowed the Sherman Act to
reach the London reinsurers. Plaintiff-respondents not only argued to
affirm jurisdiction but also argued that the Court should seize the oppor-
tunity to put an end to the reasonableness test, which plaintiff-respon-
dents characterized as a vague doctrine of abstention that ran counter to
jurisdiction as prescribed under the FTAIA.47
Justice Scalia, writing for a four member dissent vigorously attacked
this position.48 However, the majority managed to avoid the matter
almost entirely by working on the assumption that the "only substantial
question was whether there is 'a true conflict between domestic and
foreign law.' ,49 This assumption rendered irrelevant "other consider-
ations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of
jurisdiction on grounds of international comity,"'  thus obviating the
question of what factors should be included in the reasonableness test.
More importantly, the majority skirted the issue as to whether such a
test should be applied at all.
The majority's reasoning appears to rest on two dubious conclusions
in the arguments in the amicus brief filed by the DOJ supporting the
45. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F2d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2891.
46. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F2d at 934.
47. Brief for Respondent States at 11, Hartford Insurance, 113 S. Ct. 2891, cited in
Weiner, supra note 44, at 1069 n.10.
48. Justice Souter, for the majority, noted that the FTAIA takes no position on the issue
of international comity. Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2910; see also Hawk, supra note 27,
at 222-23; Griffin, supra note 11, at 7 n. 14. Justice Scalia, however, took the position that
scrutiny for reasonableness is not a matter of judicial abstention to be exercised after jurisdic-
tion is established but rather a prior matter of congressional intent: "[T]he extraterritorial
reach of the Sherman Act ... has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a
question of substantive law turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress
asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct." Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at
2918. Thus, this was a matter of "legislative jurisdiction" - jurisdiction to prescribe, not
jurisdiction to adjudicate. Id. Scrutiny for reasonableness of jurisdiction is read into our
statutes under the Charming Betsy principle: "[An act of law ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. The Charm-
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.). Justice Souter, for the majority, rejected
this argument that "comity concerns figure into the prior analysis whether jurisdiction exists
under the Sherman Act," stating that "[tihis contention is inconsistent with the general
understanding that the Sherman Act covers foreign conduct producing a substantial intended
effect in the United States, and that concerns of comity come into play, if at all, only after a
court has determined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction."
Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. it 2909 n.24.
49. Id. at 2910.
50. Id. at 2911.
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plaintiff-respondents. First, the DOJ noted that "[n]either [defendant-]
petitioners nor their amici argue that in the absence of conflict the
district court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction.' This led the
DOJ to conclude that, since the existence of a "conflict" was the only
sticking point according to petitioners,* "other comity factors" need not
be considered - though it is far from clear that the Court should not
have considered such factors sua sponte.52 Second, the DOJ posited that
a "conflict for purposes of comity analysis must be 'a true conflict be-
tween domestic and foreign law,'-53 - even though the previous step in
the reasoning made it sensible to define conflict in the way the defen-
dant-petitioners had meant to. The majority opinion of the Court adopt-
ed this definition in its analysis by implicitly defining a "true conflict"
as one "where a person subject to regulation by two states can[not]
comply with the laws of both. 54 Since U.K. regulation allowed (i.e., did
not explicitly prohibit) the reinsurance of companies insuring against
polluter liability, there was no conflict.
The majority opinion's reasoning was faulty in several other re-
spects,55 but the relevant point here is that the opinion's analysis regard-
ing jurisdiction appears to have turned on a technicality; its insistence
on the need for a "true conflict" was based on the defendant-petitioners'
failure to invoke other balancing factors while contesting jurisdiction. If
so, the Supreme Court has neither rejected the reasonableness test nor
51. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at point Ill-d,
Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2891, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File
[hereinafter DOJ Amicus].
52. Like the question of subject matter jurisdiction in federal-state relations, prescriptive
jurisdiction does not involve individual rights but rather systemic questions. In the case of
subject-matter jurisdiction these are questions related to the nature of the federal system. In
the case of prescriptive jurisdiction, these are analogous questions about the boundaries of
power between nations. Thus, the issues raised are not a question of rights that can be waived
by the parties to a suit, but rather questions that should be addressed sua sponte by the court.
53. DOJ Amicus, supra note 51; see also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
54. Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2910.
55. First, though it purports to be based on Justice Blackmun's dictum in Socijti
Nationale, which referred to the need to consider only "true conflicts," the majority opinion's
definition of a true conflict is different from what was probably meant by Justice Blackmun.
Justice Blackmun used the phrase in reference to U.S. domestic conflicts analysis. A true
conflict in this context means only that "each state involved has a policy that would be
advanced by the application of its laws." WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLIc'rs OF LAWS 216 (2d ed. 1993). It does not mean that the laws have
to contain mutually exclusive rules as the majority in Hartford Insurance chose to define it.
Second, the majority opinion seems to draw its definition of true conflict from § 403(3)
of the Restatement (Third). However, as Justice Scalia notes in his dissent, the Restatement's
conflicts test is designed to apply only after the reasonableness test of § 403(1) has been
satisfied. Hartford Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2922 n. I1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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replaced it with the narrower test of "true conflict" as defined in the
opinion.
Hartford Insurance is nonetheless significant to those interested in
assessing the practical reach of U.S. antitrust laws. The broader message
of the case is suggested by the fact that five of nine Supreme Court
justices were inclined not to engage in interest-balancing. Otherwise, the
majority could have easily considered the "other factors" of the reason-
ableness test sua sponte, not limiting its judgment to the so-called "true
conflicts" analysis. However, with new justices on the Court, it is proba-
bly premature to draw any conclusions about the fate of interest-balanc-
ing as a means of controlling the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust
laws.
d. Summing up the Status of Prescriptive Jurisdiction
and International Comity in U.S. Courts
It is undisputed that Congress intends the antitrust laws to apply
extraterritorially, including to protect exports. It is also clear under U.S.
law that the courts must accept this prescription as a matter of principle,
regardless of its compatibility with international law. The potential
limitations on jurisdiction are the statutory effects test and the judicially
developed reasonableness test. The latter has been adhered to by some
of the circuit courts and a four member minority on the Supreme Court,
but a majority on the Court appears to have avoided the issue. All
doctrinal subtleties aside, the fact is that most cases are not dismissed




The efficacy of U.S. antitrust laws against foreign trade-restrictive
business practices does not depend solely on whether those practices
come within the reach of the antitrust laws; they must also violate them.
Though there may be some overlap in the goals of antitrust and the
policy of free trade, it should not be assumed that trade-restrictive
business practices will tend to give rise to violations. U.S. antitrust law
has developed primarily as a remedy for conduct, at home or abroad,
that harms the U.S. domestic market, not U.S. export commerce. Not
surprisingly, the rules crafted over the years by the courts under the
general mandates of the Sherman and Clayton Acts do not appear partic-
56. Weintraub, supra note 29, at 1811-12.
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ularly designed to help businesses enter new geographical markets." As
one commentator has observed: "Since the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme
Court has made clear that the U.S. antitrust laws protect "competition,
not competitors.'' 58 "For that reason, in domestic commerce cases, the
exclusion of one or even several competitors from a market is cause for
antitrust concern only if the probable effect of that exclusion would be
to reduce output below, and raise prices above, competitive levels in a
relevant market."5 9 Though probable effect may have little significance
in foreign commerce cases involving clearly per se offenses, it may well
influence the outcome in rule-of-reason cases. Also, it may influence
courts' characterization of practices as falling within the per se or rule-
of-reason categories.
To be sure, a number of potentially trade-restrictive business practic-
es may violate antitrust laws. These might, for example, include group
boycotts (refusals to deal), buyers' cartels,' predatory pricing,61 cross-
licensing (patent pooling),62 or fraudulent procurement of patents when
this confers de facto monopoly power.63 Finally, as evidenced in the
Pilkington Consent Decree discussed infra, territorial restrictions im-
posed under intellectual property licensing agreements can be both
illegal and extremely stifling to international trade. However, it remains
57. This is in contrast to the EC's competition policy, which is designed partly to further
market integration by ensuring that the work of dismantling governmental barriers to free
trade is not undermined by private restrictions. On the difference between treatment of
vertical restrictions under U.S. and EC antitrust law due to this difference in policy concerns,
see Stavros Petropoulos, Parallel Imports, "Free Riders" and the Distribution of Motor
Vehicles in the EEC: The Eco System/Peugeot Case, 2 CONsuM. L.J. 9 (1994).
58. Deborah Garza, DOJ's New Export-Promotion Policy: Using the Sherman Act to
Remedy the Exclusion of U.S. Firms from Foreign Markets, 9 ANTITRUST 28, 31 (1994)
(citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977), quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
59. Garza, supra note 58, at 31 (citing Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1984)).
60. Buyers' cartels occur when buyers collude to force low prices or other terms of
purchase and have been the subject of successful "export opportunities" suits. See United
States v. C. Itoh & Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (terminating
by consent decree Japanese buyers' cartel formed to purchase Alaska tanner crab); Daishowa
Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(granting preliminary injunction prohibiting a buyers' cartel, formed to respond to a Webb-
Pomerene export cartel, from boycotting the plaintiff-U.S. exporter as part of its cartel
strategy); see also Griffin, supra note I], at 8.
61. Predatory pricing might be used to keep out selected foreign competition at crucial
moments. It is, however, difficult to imagine a case where this would be effective because
most exporters, when faced with predatory pricing, would retreat to their home market or
other foreign markets until competitive prices are restored.
62. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (defendant was
a U.S. company).
63. Proposed Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Foreign Markets, supra note 1I, at
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true that U.S. antitrust laws are not particularly geared to promoting
exports and that, consequently, numerous trade-restrictive business
practices will have to be dealt with by other means, if at all. This is
likely the case with the Japanese Keiretsu, which, ironically, are the
very type of business practice that has motivated calls to use the anti-
trust laws to promote exports. 64
a. The Keiretsu and U.S. Antitrust Law
At least in political fora, allegations that anticompetitive practices in
Japan are partially to blame for the U.S.-Japan trade deficit have cen-
tered on Keiretsu relationships65 and led to calls for the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law to remedy the problem.66 Two uncertain
assumptions are at work. One is that Keiretsu practices are responsible
in part for the trade imbalance. 67 The other assumption, examined here,
is that Keiretsu relationships may be successfully pursued under U.S.
antitrust law.
In terms of basic structure, the Keiretsu generally seems to escape
U.S. antitrust law, at least when located abroad. The Keiretsu is struc-
tured through cross-ownership and interlocking directorates. 68 The
relevant antitrust provision, Section 8 of the Clayton Act, applies to
64. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
65. "Keiretsu is a relationship or a combination of relationships among corporations
independently incorporated." Jiro Tamura, U.S. Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law
to Japanese Keiretsu, 25 J. INT'L L. & POL. 385, 385 n.3 (1993).
66. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, PHASE I: JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING U.S. ACCESS, H.R. Doc. No. 332-283 vii (1990). See also Gary R.
Saxonhouse, Japan, SII and the International Harmonization of Domestic Economic Practic-
es, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 462-63 (1990).
67. Alan 0. Sykes has concluded:
The proposition that unique impediments exist to penetrating the Japanese market
may or may not be correct. A combination of language barriers, quality problems,
and marketing ineptitude on the U.S. side may explain much of the apparent
difficulty in selling to Japan. Likewise, the perception that selling in Japan is
unduly difficult may be an artifact of its persistent trade surplus, attributable in part
to the need for foreign capital in the United States driven by U.S. fiscal policy, and
the ability of the Japanese to supply it.
Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: the
Limited Case .for Section 301, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 303 (1991-92); see also,
Saxonhouse, supra note 66, at 462-69.
68. Saxonhouse notes that cross-ownership would tend to influence policy only to the
extent that the holdings of companies outside of Keiretsu are dispersed. In fact, however, they
tend to be concentrated in the hands of one or two outside companies, indicating that they
should effectively counter the influence of Keiretsu holdings. Saxonhouse, supra note 66, at
463.
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cross-ownership and interlocking directorates among competitors.69 But
the "horizontal" Keiretsu is not a grouping of competitors but rather a
conglomeration of noncompeting entities from different sectors. 70 More-
over, Section 8 applies to "commerce," which arguably does not include
foreign trade in the context of that statute.7' Thus, horizontal Keiretsu
may entirely escape exposure to U.S. antitrust law. As to possible
limitations on vertical Keiretsu, which are characterized by integrated
distribution or production, the Clayton Act rules on vertical ownership
do not apply where the restrictive effects only concern export opportuni-
72ties .
Therefore, the structure of Keiretsu does not appear to be subject to
legal attack under the Clayton Act. But certain practices inyolved in
Keiretsu relationships may be actionable under U.S. antitrust laws.
Territorial restrictions (e.g., through exclusive dealerships under licens-
ing) are perhaps actionable but not likely to be of concern to exporters
because they affect predominately intrabrand competition.73 On the other
hand, vertical boycotts, reciprocal dealing, and exclusive dealing are
examples of actionable arrangements that might be practiced by Keiretsu
and which might impede exports.74 Exclusive dealing will be briefly
examined here, as this practice appears to be most susceptible to a
successful suit.
75
b. Keiretsu and Exclusive Dealing
Keiretsu exclusive dealing, whereby a distributor is only allowed to
deal in one brand, acts to block avenues of entry.76 Even this cause of
action against the Keiretsu appears to be a weak one. To be actionable
under Section Three of the Clayton Act, exclusive dealing must be
mandatory - possibly not often the case with vertical Keiretsu. 77 Fur-
69. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
70. See, e.g., Joel Davidow, Antitrust and Keiretsu, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1039,
1044 (1993); Alex Y. Seita, Discussing Japan Rationally, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 193,
217-23 (1993).
71. Davidow, supra note 70, at 1044-45.
72. Id. at 1042; Hawk, supra note 27, at 219.
73. Julie A. Shepard, Using United States Antitrust Law Against the Keiretsu as a Wedge
into the Japanese Market, 6 TRANS'L LAW 345, 354 n.78 (1993). This is not true when the
particular technology under license is crucial to competition. See infra part I.B.3 (discussing
the practices eliminated under the Consent Decree).
74. Davidow, supra note 70, at 1039.
75. Id. at 1049.
76. Shepard, supra note 73, at 368.
77. Another possible basis, not examined here, would be § 5 of the FTC Act. Davidow,
supra note 70, at 1040.
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thermore, the effect of the exclusive dealing must be to lessen substan-
tially competition in the relevant geographic market. While one author
has concluded that the relevant market would be Japan, 78 another has
noted that this is far from clear, since the relevant geographic market
includes all possible profitable outlets for the foreclosed competitor's
goods.79 In any event, even if the relevant market in distribution is
substantially foreclosed, courts will consider the availability of alterna-
tive means of entry, including the possibility of setting up one's own
dealerships.80
Another basis for attacking exclusive dealing could be Section One
of the Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade.8 As a nonprice vertical restraint,
exclusive dealing is not a per se violation. The analysis, as under Sec-
tion Three of the Clayton Act, would involve considering alternative
means of entry, including entering through independent distributors or
by vertically integrating.82 The costs of these alternatives, to the extent
that they could be deemed prohibitive and thus restrictive, would then
be weighed in a rule-of-reason analysis against the positive effects for
consumers of the exclusive dealing arrangement.83 These positive effects
might include improvements in services rendered to the consumer
resulting from the dealers' specialization in one brand, and savings from
the simplification of distribution channels that could be passed on to the
consumer.
84
The Japanese Kereitsu appears to hold up well when subjected to
the scrutiny that we apply to our own firms at home. But should those
standards apply to conduct abroad? Eminent antitrust scholars have
allowed that they should not be rigorously applied to foreign conduct.85
78. Shepard, supra note 73, at 357.
79. Davidow, supra note 70, at 1040.
80. Id. One cautiously optimistic author has pointed to studies suggesting that removal of
distributors from the market through exclusive dealing arrangements concentrates the remain-
ing market, "increasing the probability that nonaffiliated suppliers can collude." Weiner, supra
note 44, at 1071. Though such a claim might work in the domestic context, it would involve
considerably stretching the directness element of the effects test required for establishing
prescriptive jurisdiction in suits brought against foreign conduct.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990).
82. See Shepard, supra note 73, at 361 n.163.
83. Id. at 359.
84. Id. at 362-63.
85. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 237.
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The following subsection raises the more particular question whether,
and what, different standards should apply to foreign conduct that harms
U.S. export, as opposed to domestic, commerce.
3. Quandaries Concerning the Relationship Between Prescriptive
Jurisdiction and Substantive Antitrust Analysis
There is a paradoxical relationship between the goals underlying the
prescriptive jurisdiction ascribed to U.S. antitrust laws by Congress and
the goals embodied in the substantive law developed by the courts. On
the one hand, as noted in Part I.A.1, the FTAIA reflects Congress'
desire to see the Sherman and Clayton Acts applied to protect exporters.
On the other hand, as noted in Part I.A.2, the courts have come to
interpret the latter laws so as to protect competition, not competitors.8 6
This incongruence poses a quandary. How should the judge rule on the
merits in cases where domestic competition is unaffected and competi-
tors - U.S. exporters - are the only casualties? One answer would be
to presume that Congress, when enacting the FTAIA, was simply assert-
ing the jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws, without implications for
substantive analysis. It would then make sense to presume also that
domestic competition was still the concern, not competition in the world
at large. If so, then suits filed against practices restricting U.S. exports
should be successful on the merits only when the targeted practices also
happen to affect negatively the U.S. domestic market.8 7
An alternative, and more plausible, reading of the FTAIA would be
to suppose that its provisions on the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts imply a mandate for the courts to interpret the goals
of these laws differently when they are applied to foreign conduct
impeding exports. But, if so, the question of how the substantive analy-
sis should be adjusted presents yet another quandary. The balancing of
competitive gains against competitive losses which inheres in antitrust
analysis will tend to find the losses in the U.S. and the gains abroad. 8
Should the judge consider gains abroad? If so, with what degree of
deference to the judgment of foreign regulators?
86. See Garza, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
87. Indeed, example E of the Draft Guidelines for International Operations envisages that
these enforcement agencies would bring suit against practices "resulting [in] sales into the
United States [that] affect output and price in the U.S." as well as impairing U.S. exports.
Draft Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 7, at 52,817. Yet other examples
involve practices having no effect on the U.S. domestic market.. See, e.g., id. (example F).
88. Balancing is most. often associated with rule-of-reason analysis because this involves
balancing of "pro" and "anti" competitive factors in the particulars of the case. However, the
"per se rule is merely a special case of the rule of reason," VII AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 13, 1509, whereby balancing occurs ex ante with regard to a category of practices
rather than on the particulars of each case.
Fall 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
The problem is posed most starkly in the hypothetical Keiretsu
exclusive dealing arrangement discussed in Part I.A.2.b. The scale that
measures the pros and cons of this business practice sits, so to speak,
astride the jurisdictional frontier of the United States and Japan, with the
pros weighing on one side and the cons on the other. Efficiency gains
will go to the Japanese domestic market, and the losses will be on the
U.S. export market. The dilemma is thus whether the court should factor
in the gains to the Japanese domestic market, in this case the possibly
improved services provided to the consumer resulting from exclusive
distribution arrangments. Not to take these gains into account would be
to apply a double standard, subjecting foreign business to a more rigid
rule. But, if the court is to evaluate gains to the Japanese consumer, this
seems a distinctly uncomfortable exercise. The effects doctrine allows
extraterritorial regulation in reaction to harmful effects within the home
territory. While this basis for jurisdiction easily warrants deciding
whether there is domestic harm, it does not seem to warrant deciding
what is best for the foreign country in which harmful conduct takes
place, in this case, deciding whether the exclusive dealing arrangement
offers gains to the Japanese consumer that offset any competitive costs
of the arrangement. As was the case regarding the quandary concerning
the interpretation of the FTAIA, one response could be to divorce
substantive analysis from jurisdictional considerations, once jurisdiction
has been established. However, jurisdictional and substantive inquiries
are not wholly independent.8 9 Thus, rather than second guessing other
country's policies, the courts may be inclined to assume pro-competitive
effects and assign these effects a weight equivalent to whatever defer-
ence they deem appropriate to accord to the interests of the foreign
sovereign. In this sense comity considerations similar to those applied in
a "jurisdictional rule-of-reason" analysis would be introduced into the
substantive rule-of-reason analysis on one side of the balancing equa-
tion.9° This solution would, of course, have the unhappy effect of inject-
ing at the level of substantive analysis the same degree of uncertainty
that already exists at the level of jurisdictional inquiry in most cases of
extraterritorial application of laws. This hypothetical appears, further-
more, to present terra incognita for the courts, since the cases generally
89. I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 237.
90. As Professor Areeda has stated, "[in examining a foreign restraint, the conclusion
that Congress did not mean to cover it might be expressed either in terms of the statute's
jurisdictional reach or in terms of a substantive conclusion about the 'reasonableness' of the
restraint." Id. 1 237. In per se cases, such a scheme would not be possible at the level of
determining a violation, but comity considerations might well come into play in determining
the remedy. For an alternative solution, see BREWSTER & ATWOOD, supra note 18, at 205-06.
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cited in connection with export restraints tend to involve either practices
that are theoretically per se illegal, such as group boycotts, 9' or practices
involving U.S. defendants that collude with foreign businesses, so that
the pro-competitive aspects of the litigious restraint can be evaluated as
affecting the U.S. market.9
Thus, antitrust suits brought against practices abroad solely because
they harm U.S. export commerce introduce significant analytical prob-
lems not present in suits attacking foreign practices that harm the U.S.
domestic market. This is so even though both types of suit involve the
extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. Discussion in the next
section will turn to the U.S. Government's antitrust enforcement agen-
cies' policy of bringing suits to promote exports, focusing on why this
came about and what kinds of jurisdictional limitations the government
is likely to set for itself within the broader parameters of the statutory
test outlined supra. However, it should be noted in concluding this
discussion of substantive analysis that, while the new Draft Guidelines
for International Operations give ample space to the matters of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction and comity, they pass over the attendant substan-
tive dilemmas raised by suits to protect export commerce. The Draft
Guidelines tersely allow that "[a]nticompetitive conduct that affects U.S.
domestic or foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust laws re-
gardless of where such conduct occurs or the nationality of the parties
involved." 93 This statement, which focuses on the nationality and locus
of offenders, misses the issue discussed above, which arises from the
fact that the "locus" of effects is foreign rather than domestic U.S.
commerce.
B. Government Policy
This section will indicate the significance of enforcement policy
espoused by government and discuss the genesis of the current policy of
bringing suits to protect export opportunities as it was announced by the
DOJ in 1992. Then it will examine a recent case of enforcement of this
type. Finally, in the light of this case and the Draft Guidelines for
International Operations, some effort will be made to surmise what
enforcement policy is likely to be in practice.
91. See cases cited supra note 60.
92. See, e.g., Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 100 (regarding a defendant U.S. company which
had entered into a joint venture involving patent pooling with a Canadian company).
93. Draft Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 7, at 52,815.
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1. The Importance of Government Enforcement Policy
The Restatement (Third) on the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, in a passage referring specifically to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of antitrust law, observes that, "[iun general, the exercise of regula-
tory jurisdiction by the United States is evaluated in the same way
whether the law is invoked in litigation by a private party or by an
agency of the United States Government."94 This may be an accurate
description of the courts' overt evaluation of jurisdiction, but they are
nonetheless likely to be swayed by the judgment of a government
agency in a matter so charged with foreign policy implications as anti-
trust law. This may in turn influence trends in private litigation.95 In
particular, government enforcement policy - not only its own filings,
but also amicus briefs and even general policy statements - may affect
judicial receptiveness to assertions of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction
by litigants seeking treble damages. Consequently, such policy has
repercussions well beyond the limited number of cases that the DOJ or
the FTC themseves may bring.
2. Enforcement Policy as Announced in 1992
The DOJ announced in footnote 159 of its 1988 Antitrust Enforce-
ment Guidelines for International Operations (1988 International Guide-
lines) that it would limit its enforcement activities to conduct that could
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 415, cmt. G.
95. Griffin, supra note 11, at 13. There are several possibilities for synergetic effects.
First, a successful suit by the DOJ will encourage exporters to sue. Id. Second, exporters
might invest considerable resources in getting the DOJ to sue in order to reap later the
benefits of such an investment through res judicata arguments in treble damages suits.
Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 204. This might be particularly attractive as an
alternative to bringing suits in the first instance because courts might accept the DOJ's
general claim that they should not engage in the reasonableness test when the DOJ brings
suits. See, e.g., DOJ Amicus, supra note 51, point III.c ("We believe that courts should not
engage in any comity analysis in antitrust actions brought by the United States"). Finally,
though the threshold issue of jurisdiction should not in principle be determined by expressions
of executive interest, the possibility for influence is there. Intervention in the form of an
amicus brief on the issue of sovereign immunity is thought often to carry weight beyond the
actual merits of the legal arguments presented because of the fact of foreign state involve-
ment. Garvey, supra note 36, at 491-92. Similar weight might be given to the DOJ arguments
presented in the context of a private antitrust suit given the foreign public policy consider-
ations involved. Perhaps more far-fetched, but not entirely remote, is the possible influence of
the DOJ's general endorsement of export-opportunity suits reflected in the 1992 rescission of
footnote 159 of the 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations. See
ANTITRUST DIVISION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTER-
NATIONAL OPERATIONS (1988) [hereinafter 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES]. Even if the
DOJ's general policy statement does not turn out to influence judges, exporters may initially
bring suits in hopes that it will.
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"harm U.S. consumers by reducing output or raising prices. 96 This was
purely a matter of prosecutorial discretion, since the antitrust statutes
themselves contain no such limitation. 97 In April 1992, the DOJ rescind-
ed its policy of abstention, stating that it "will, in appropriate cases, take
antitrust enforcement action against conduct occurring overseas that
restrains United States exports, whether or not there is direct harm to
U.S. consumers." 98 Thus, after a brief hiatus, the DOJ reopened the
possibility that it bring cases motivated purely by the concern of market
access, in essence deleting footnote 159 of the 1988 International Guide-
lines. The Draft Guidelines for International Operations issued jointly by
the DOJ and the FTC in the fall of 1994 maintain this stance.99
While the policy of abstention seems to have been part of the gener-
al hands-off approach to regulation of the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions, the 1992 return to former policy appears in part to have been a
tactical move. It took place in an election year amidst accusations in
Congress of lax enforcement of antitrust law regarding Japanese
Keiretsu, and in particular criticism of the policy announced in 1988 of
not bringing cases against conduct abroad unless it harmed U.S. con-
sumers.' °° At the same time, the Bush Administration had been meeting
with resistance from Japan in talks under the Strategic Impediments
Initiative (SII) on the issue of restrictive business practices. Notwith-
standing official statements to the contrary,' °' the change of policy was
perceived in the United States and Japan as a thinly veiled threat ad-
dressed to Japan.
Subsequently, the SII talks yielded commitments on the part of
Japanese authorities to step up enforcement of their antitrust law. The
results included increases in the budget and staffing of the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission, a quadrupling of the administrative fines in civil
cases, and significant increases in criminal penalties. 0 2 For its part, the
96. 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 30 n.159.
97. See discussion supra part I.A.l (on the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. antitrust
statutes).
98. DOJ Policy, supra note 6.
99. "[T]he Agencies may in appropriate cases take enforcement action against
anticompetitive conduct, wherever occurring, that restrains U.S. exports .... Draft Guide-
lines for International Operations, supra note 7, at 52,817.
100. Davidow, supra note 70, at 1048.
101. James F. Rill, then Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division
of the DOJ, reportedly "emphasized that policy change is one of general application and is
not aimed at particular foreign markets." DOJ Policy, supra note 6, at 3.
102. Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman, Address Before the World Trade
Center Chicago Seminar on GAT After Uruguay (May 16, 1994), in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
U.S. ANTITRUST POLICIES IN WORLD TRADE 7 (1994) [hereinafter Bingaman Address].
Fall 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
DOJ stated in 1992 that it was "prepared to work with antitrust authori-
ties in the importing country if they are better situated to remedy the
conduct and are prepared to act."' 03 A more recent statement makes it
clear that this option is to be preferred and that extraterritorial action by
the DOJ is to occur only after failed attempts to obtain enforcement by
foreign authorities."
With the DOJ preference for foreign enforcement and the apparent
success of SII talks, it appeared as if the rescinding of footnote 159
might be better represented as a successful tactic rather than an actual
change in enforcement policy. However, Anne Bingaman, who heads the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ, recently announced that the DOJ's hopes
that enforcement by Japanese authorities would be adequate have begun
to diminish and that U.S. extraterritorial enforcement will thus be pur-
sued.' O5 Yet, no suits have been brought against Japanese companies
operating out of Japan since the 1992 policy change, and indeed since
1982.'06 As will be seen below, there is perhaps a distinction to be made
between the general policy announced with the rescinding of footnote
159 and the particular issue of Japanese restrictive business practices.
3. Policy in Practice: the Pilkington Consent Decree
It is probably too early to draw firm conclusions about the DOJ's
post-1992 enforcement policy. However, the Pilkington case, which
resulted in a consent decree (Consent Decree), is an exemplary case and
the first to implement post-1992 DOJ policy.'0 7 Pilkington, a U.K. firm,
dominates the world's flat-glass industry, which includes glass used in
windows and automobile windshields. 08 Almost all flat glass is pro-
duced using a "float" process and is referred to as "float glass." World-
wide shipments of float glass in 1991 were worth approximately $15
billion.109
103. DOJ Policy, supra note 6, addendum at 2 (Department of Justice Policy Regarding
Anticompetitive Conduct that Restricts U.S. Exports: Statement of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy).
104. Bingaman Address, supra note 102, at 7.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Two cases were brought in 1982. See Itoh, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010;
Daishowa, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774.
107. United States v. Pilkington plc, Civil No. 94-345 (D. Ariz. filed June 25, 1994).
108. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pub. No. 94-283, Justice Department Files First Antitrust Suit
Against Foreign Company Since 1992 Policy Change 1 (May 26, 1994) (press release
available from the DOJ and on file with author).
109. Complaint for the United States at 6, United States v. Pilkington plc, Civil No. 94-
345 (D. Ariz. filed June 25, 1994) [hereinafter Pilkington Complaint] (on file with author).
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In 1962, Pilkington developed improvements to the float-glass
process, patented these improvements, and transferred the patented
technology along with certain know-how to its principal competitors
through restrictive licensing agreements.' 0 Two aspects of the licensing
agreements were stifling to trade. First, many agreements contained
restrictions on the export of float glass from allocated territories."'
Second, and more crucially, all of the agreements restricted each licens-
ee's right to construct and operate float-glass factories to a specified
territory or group of countries, generally corresponding to the territory
in which the licensee previously manufactured glass.1 2 Given that thirty
to fifty new plants are expected to be built world-wide within the next
six years, the DOJ estimated that exclusion from the market for building
those plants would result in a loss of somewhere between $150 million
and $1.25 billion in U.S. export revenues over that six-year period." 3
The DOJ claimed that "Pilkington's maintenance and continued enforce-
ment of the license restraints ... was not justified by any intellectual
property rights of substantial value."".4 Under the Consent Decree,
Pilkington agreed to end restraints against U.S. companies anywhere in
the world,' 15 to end restraints on foreign companies selling in the U.S.," 1
6
and not to engage in unlawful monopolies. 117
4. Distinguishing Rhetoric from Policy
If the Pilkington Consent Decree is any indication of future DOJ
practice, it seems that the DOJ pronouncements of early 1992 should be
read on at least three levels. First, at thesuperficial level, there was the
official statement that "the policy change has general application and is
not aimed at particular foreign markets.. '"8 At a second level was the
110. Id. at 8-9.
111. Id. at 10.
•112. Id. at 8-9.
113. Justice Department Files First Antitrust Suit Against Foreign Company Since 1992
Policy Change, supra note 108, at 3. The agreements also contained limitation-on-use provi-
sions that kept licensees from improving the technology and thereby deprived consumers of
the benefits of more efficient production techniques. Pilkington Complaint, supra note 109, at
9. Thus while the stated DOJ policy is that cases will be brought regardless of whether U.S.
consumers are harmed, the DOJ alleged that U.S. consumers were harmed in this case. Id. at
8-9. This harm, however, appears secondary to the losses in export opportunities, and it
would appear that the DOJ threw in the allegation of consumer harm for good measure.
114. Pilkington Complaint, supra note 109, at 8-9.
115. Consent Decree, supra note 6, at 30,605.
116. Id. at 30,606.
117. Justice Department Files First Antitrust Suit Against Foreign Company Since 1992
Policy Change, supra note 108, at 3.
118. DOJ Policy, supra note 6.
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political innuendo singling out Japan as the target of the new policy.
Finally, actual practice as evidenced in the Pilkington Consent Decree
would suggest a refined version of the official statement. Pilkington
suggests a preference for cases involving practices that impede U.S.
commerce not only with the home country of the offending party but
also with other territories.
Though it would be comforting to see such a preference reflected in
the Draft Guidelines for International Operations, they do not appear to
contemplate any such limitation. Indeed, discussion following one exam-
ple states: "The mere fact that only the market of [one country] appears
to be foreclosed is not enough to defeat" jurisdiction under the
FTAIA." 9 However, this quote follows a hypothetical case in which
"companies agree at a trade association meeting (1) to refuse to adopt
any U.S. company technology as an industry standard and (2) to boycott
any distributor ... that stocks competing U.S. products." This suggests
an exception to the preference for cases involving restrictions of exports
to more than one country in instances where the anticompetitive practic-
es have no other purpose than to thwart trade with the U.S. It is no
doubt wishful thinking to ascribe this scheme of rules and exceptions to
conscious policy on the part of the U.S. enforcement agencies. Suffice it
here to point out that practice and stated policy are at least not in con-
flict with this scheme, which will be central to the formula proposed in
Part III of this note.
II. COERCION: SECTION 301
The first part of this note considered the option of applying antitrust
law extraterritorially to eliminate trade-restrictive business practices.
When viewed as an attempt to solve a trade problem, the antitrust option
is novel, if not unorthodox. The elimination of trade barriers is usually
seen to be a matter of intergovernmental relations: each government
holds the key to its domestic market, and any country wishing to exploit
that market must somehow convince the gatekeeper to open the door.
The antitrust remedy ignores this convention of trade relations by pass-
ing over the gatekeeper's head, so to speak, to regulate directly and
unilaterally the businesses that are obstructing trade.
This part of the note will focus on an option that is no more friend-
ly than unilateral regulation but which is a bit more conventional in
trade relations: coercion. In particular, this part will examine the statu-
tory basis for coercive trade policy provided in Sections 301-310 of the
119. Draft Guidelines. for International Operations, supra note 7, at 52,817.
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1974 Trade Act (Section 301).120 These provisions require the USTR to
investigate practices that burden or restrict United States commerce;
determine whether they are actionable; negotiate to reach settlement
with the offending government following a positive determination; and,
if negotiations fail, retaliate, usually by restricting access to the U.S.
market.12 ' Note that the steps in the Section 301 process - investiga-
tion, determination, negotiation, and settlement or retaliation - do not
all involve unilateral action on the part of the United States. Negotiation
and settlement are intergovernmental processes, and of course any
settlement is implemented by the foreign government. In this sense,
Section 301 fits with the more conventional government-to-government
scheme of trade relations, and it is significantly less unilateral than the
antitrust remedy, which is directly administered by the U.S. courts. The
term "unilateralism" is employed in connection with Section 301 to
highlight the fact that it involves the use of unilateral threat tactics
rather than the reciprocal processes of offer and request which presum-
ably lead to a mutually satisfactory trade deal.
The following sections are designed to offer the reader an idea of
whether, and to what extent, Section 301 may be used against private
trade barriers. The first section points out some general characteristics of
Section 301 which are essential to understanding how its provisions are
likely to function. The second section looks at whether trade-restrictive
business practices are actionable under Section 301. The next section
warns that the use of Section 301 is substantially constrained by politi-
cal considerations and by international commitments undertaken within
the context of the World Trade Organization. The final section considers
what experience suggests about the use of Section 301 to remedy private
trade barriers.
A. The Political Nature of Section 301
As a provision of trade law, Section 301 is unique in that it is
primarily an instrument of conquest. Though it offers some potential for
protecting the home market, its main purpose is to facilitate aggressive
action on the part of the U.S. Government to open foreign markets.
Conquest is not a matter of right to be adamantly defended. It is rather
a matter of seizing opportunities, in the proper time and place. Thus, the
drafters of the 1974 Trade Act wisely ensured that the provisions of
120. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
121. Retaliation is limited to the withdrawal of trade concessions. Trade embargoes and
the like are naturally reserved for a different scale of retaliation not provided for under
Section 301.
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Section 301 allow it to be implemented with a great deal of flexibility.
At the same time, Section 301, particularly as amended in 1988, reflects
the desire of Congress that the Executive branch not be left entirely to
its own devices in carrying out aggressive trade policy. For this reason,
a number of provisions require accountability before Congress and a fair
degree of transparency vis-A-vis the public at large. This lends to the
process a level of domestic political involvement that is uncharacteristic
of most trade diplomacy. The process is thus its own brand of politics
- neither quite as secretive and flexible as diplomacy, nor as predict-
able and rigid as most legal process. The following subsections describe
the basic traits that give Section 301 its peculiarly political nature and
point out their consequences.
1. The General Characteristics of Section 301
a. Congressional Review
Implementation of Section 301 has thus far escaped judicial review
and will probably continue to do so. Consequently, as one experienced
commentator has put it, Section 301 "is the sort of statute that only
Congress can enforce."' 22 There are a number of provisions that facili-
tate "congressional review" and political scrutiny in general. Lists of
priority countries must be drawn up by the USTR and presented to
Congress; a determination not to pursue a case must be published in the
Federal Register; 23 and progress on implementation of settlements must
be reported to Congress.' 2'
b. Porous Provisions
The drafting of Section 301 has been described as "an intricate maze
of mandatory commands in one place and extremely wide loopholes in
the other."'25 For example, the provisions requiring mandatory action
under Section 301(a) are followed by a series of escape devices, includ-
ing "extraordinary cases where [mandatory] action .. .would have an
adverse impact on the United States economy substantially out of pro-
portion to the benefits of [such] action."'126 These loopholes may at times
122. Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 9, at 113, 122; see also id. at 122 n. 13.
123. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414 (West 1980).
124. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420 (West 1980).
125. See Hudec, supra note 122, at 122.
126. Some experts have also noted that even the mandatory language itself appears to
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be impractical for political reasons, but as a matter of legal interpreta-
tion, the USTR has great latitude to maneuver within whatever limits
politics may impose.
c. Initiative and Control by the USTR
The key. player in a Section 301 proceeding is the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, which is in control from start to finish. It decides
whether to undertake investigations; determines on the basis of its
investigations which, if any, terms of Section 301 apply to the case; and
decides whether and how to retaliate. This concentration of governmen-
tal authority in a single agency may be contrasted to the wide dispersion
of power under the most important protective U.S. trade laws, the
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes. These statutes provide that
certain determinations are to be made by a government agency and that
others are to be made by an independent commission.1
27
A corollary of the key role given to the USTR is the relatively
insignificant role of private petitioners. The investigative stage of a
Section 301 proceeding can be initiated by the USTR itself or upon
private petition. But the role of the private petitioner is little more than
to call attention to the existence of a problem. The USTR determines
whether the case brought by a petitioner fulfills the criteria of a Sec-
tion 301 action. If the USTR makes a negative determination, the peti-
tioner has no recourse to judicial review.
offer a way out: "the Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection (c),
subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President." Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a), 19
U.S.C. § 2411(a) (emphasis added). One may read "specific direction" as referring to how
action may be taken, but it could also be read as referring to wheiher action may be taken.
The President is not subject to the mandatory provisions and so would be free to extricate the
USTR from the requirement of mandatory action without having specific reference to the
escape devices provided in § 301(a). Whether the President would be willing, as a political
matter, to intervene on the basis of such an interpretation is a separate question.
127. Under the antidumping statute, less-than-fair-value determinations are made by the
Commerce Department, and material injury determinations are made by the International
Trade Commission. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). A similar division of tasks
operates when countervailing duties are applied to offset foreign subsidies. The Commerce
Department determines the existence of a subsidy, and the International Trade Commission
determines the existence of material injury. Tariff Act of 1930, § 701, 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The U.S. escape clause procedure uses a different model to divide
power. The initial authority for the entire determination is placed in the hands of an indepen-
dent commission, the International Trade Commission. However, the President may reject the
Commission determination. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53 (West
1980). On the relation between the Commission and the President in escape clause proceed-
ings, see JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 547-49 (2d ed. 1986).
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d. Negotiated Settlement
* Relief under Section 301 takes the form of a negotiated settlement.
Foreign governments may choose not to negotiate, or to break off
negotiations, if they believe the costs of settling are greater than those of
suffering retaliation. Furthermore, even when there is a settlement,
foreign governments influence the shape of the remedy in a way that
they do not in the course of antitrust judicial proceedings. They influ-
ence the terms of the settlement by negotiating it, and they control
implementation. They may also later decide not to honor the settlement.
2. Consequences
The characteristics outlined above combine to affect the operation of
Section 301 in a number of ways.
a. An Instrument Serving Government, Not Individuals
Section 301 works to promote U.S. interests, not to defend individu-
al interests. This results most directly from the central role of the USTR
in Section 301 proceedings and the absence of judicial review. By
concentrating governmental authority in the hands of one agency, the
possibility for petitioner influence is diminished. (This is in contrast to
antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, where the dispersion
of governmental power provides petitioners with more control over the
overall flow of events than the government.) Because the whole proce-
dure escapes judicial review, this increases the margin for governmental
discretion and further reduces the influence of private petitioners. Other-
wise, the intervention of courts would bestow power on the individual
by ensuring to some degree that determinations conform to abstract
criteria objectively applied, thus divorcing the outcome of proceedings
from the political context and majority rule.
b. A Relatively Precise Instrument Among Trade Statutes
The requirements of transparency and the resulting domestic politi-
cal scrutiny under Section 301 make it appear an unwieldy instrument.
Yet when compared to the protective trade statutes, Section 301 appears
much more effective. This is yet another consequence of the fact that
the USTR may act free of the courts and with little fear that individuals
will take control of events. Under the protective trade statutes, judicial
review and the central role of petitioners minimize the possibility that
discretionary concerns of government will be reflected. The result under
Section 301 is just the opposite. This is perfectly in keeping with the
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notion that Section 301 is a tool of conquest, not defense, where the
ability to advance and retreat at will is crucial. If the process were
driven by precise legal criteria that mechanically trigger remedies,
strategic behavior would be impossible. On the other hand, the political
pressure exerted on the USTR through Section 301 procedure provides
some impetus for the USTR to achieve the statute's objective without
Congressional micromanagement or judicial interference.
28
c. A Generally Cautious, Trade-Friendly Policy
Because the USTR is the only agency that implements Section 301
and because implementation is largely discretionary, the USTR is central
to how Section 301 will be applied. The Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative is mainly in the business of negotiating trade deals and consid-
ers itself successful when markets are opened, not closed. 129 Section 301
is thus unlikely to be used when the threat of retaliation appears either
insufficient to coerce, or harmful to negotiating prospects. Moreover,
even when it deems retaliation otherwise appropriate, the USTR will
feel constrained not to retaliate in a way that breaches U.S. commit-
ments or would tend to undermine the value of trade agreements.
The trade-friendly bias of the office of the USTR can, however, be
overcome by domestic political concerns. 130 This is particularly true
where Section 301 is concerned because the USTR must report to
Congress on progress in negotiations and implementation. The volatile
moods of Congress and of public opinion at large must therefore be
considered when trying to assess the general temperament of policy
under Section 301.
d. Textual Analysis Difficult and Unreliable, yet Relevant
Section 301 is inherently imprecise and its implementation is simi-
larly unpredictable. In the absence of judicial review, judicial interpreta-
128. This is most likely the explanation for Sykes' empirical observation that implemen-
tation of Section 301 has not been "captured" by private interests, leading to its use for
protectionist, rather than aggressive purposes. See Sykes, supra note 67, at 317.
129. The relatively few cases of retaliation under Section 301 tend to support this
position. See id. (noting that Section 301 process has not been subject to "regulatory capture,"
i.e., turned to use in favor of those interested in closing off the U.S. market rather than
opening foreign markets).
130. The USTR, after all,. works for the President. Though the 1988 Trade Act formally
delegated authority from the President to the USTR in Section 301 proceedings, the USTR
soon after the adoption of the Act advised that "real authority" had not been transferred. Then
USTR Clayton Yeutter reportedly remarked that the USTR "reports to the President and
won't go against him." Fred M. Greguras, Representing the Growing Technology Company:
The Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Nov. 3,
1988, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database.
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tion cannot elucidate the section's vaguer provisions. Also, because
"Congressional review" substitutes for judicial review, one can expect
apparently precise requirements to be interpreted with some flexibility.
For example, the word of the statute will at times require that recourse
must be had to retaliation within a fixed period after negotiations or
after GATT panel proceedings are opened. However, it is generally
expected that members of Congress will not be heard to complain if the
deadline is exceeded and progress is being made.' 3 '
Although Section 301 provisions are subject to political consider-
ations and to that extent are full of uncertainty, they still bear close
analysis. The intricacies of a particular clause may be irrelevant when a
particular course of action is ruled out as a political matter, but they
could conceivably be pivotal when the USTR deems it feasible to take a
stand.
e. Jurisdiction Not an Issue
Section 301 would appear immune to criticism concerning the limits
of prescriptive jurisdiction. Neither the source of the rules nor the relief
sought supports the proposition that Section 301 proceedings involve the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 32 Foreign officials may be indig-
nant because the transparency requirements of Section 301 procedure
give them the impression that their country is on trial. But it is impor-
tant to insist that the trial is a political one, driven by public opinion,
not private rights, and controlled by the political branches, not the
judiciary. This, combined with the fact that the relief sought is a negoti-
ated settlement, means that the Section 301 remedy does not impose any
set of rules upon a foreign country. Pressure is applied on the subject
country to do something, and that country decides whether or not to
oblige. What is imposed, if anything, is the spontaneous political will of
the U.S. Government.
As to jurisdiction to enforce, with respect to retaliation, the United
States is simply restricting access to its market, risking international
131. See, e.g., Hudec, supra note 122, at 122. The flexibility shown by Congress is now
relevant to the question of whether the USTR would be required under Section 301 to
retaliate before authorization has been obtained pursuant to proceedings within GATT dispute
settlement.
132. But see Chris Shore, The Thai Copyright Case and Possible Limitations of Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction in Action Taken under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 23 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 725, 736 n.68 (1992) (arguing that in the Thai Copyright case the USTR
was attempting to "prescribe a specific interpretation of Thai law, which ... is tantamount to
prescription under the Restatement" (Third) §§ 401-403). Note that § 402 of the Restatement
refers to application of the law by administrative agencies as well as courts.
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liability, but remaining well within the bounds of its jurisdiction to
enforce within its territory.
As will be discussed infra, international law places substantial limits
on the scope of retaliation under Section 301. However, the range of
activities actionable under Section 301 is not directly affected by this
limitation because the USTR may choose to "cross-retaliate" (i.e., with-
draw trade concessions in an area unrelated to the subject of a Sec-
tion 301 proceeding). 33 Given the possibility of cross-retaliation and the
fact that Section 301 cannot be seen as an exercise in extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the legal constraints on :the range of issues that can be
addressed under Section 301 are purely a function of what issues are
actionable as a matter of domestic law; the international law constraints
thus have no direct bearing on the scope of action.
B. The Scope of Action under the Anticompetitive
Practices Clause of Section 301
Action under Section 301 can be mandatory, triggered by denial of
U.S. rights or "benefits" under a trade agreement (Section 301(a)), or
discretionary, based on acts, policies or practices that are "unreasonable"
or "discriminatory" (Section 301(b)). The following analysis will be
limited to discretionary action under Section 301(b) because this note by
hypothesis supposes the absence of international agreements addressing
trade-restrictive business practices.134 Action under Section 301(b) would
most plausibly arise under the heading of "toleration by a foreign gov-
ernment of systematic anticompetitive activities by private firms
This "anticompetitive practices clause" was inserted with the
133. See Trade Act of 1974, § 301(c)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)
("The actions the Trade Representative is authorized to take ... may be taken against any
goods or economic sector ... (B) without regard to whether or not such goods or economic
sector were involved in the act, policy, or practice that is the subject of such action").
134. Cases requiring mandatory action could nonetheless arise. First, certain existing
agreements do arguably contain obligations to eliminate restrictive business practices, though
these obligations are limited in scope. See, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services, in
Uruguay Round Final Act, supra note 1, Annex lB, art. VIII (requiring signatories to see to
it that the activities of legal or de facto monopolies or oligopolies are consistent with their
MFN or specific commitments under GATS). Mandatory action under § 301(a) might also be
triggered by denial of "benefits to the United States" under a trade agreement that does not
cover business practices but which gives rise to the expectation of benefits that would be
denied when restrictive business practices are tolerated. Finally, settlements pursuant to
discretionary action under § 301(b) may lead to commitments on the part of the subject
country to control restrictive business practices. The failure to honor such commitments
would, according to legislative history within the Senate, be regarded as an "unjustifiable"
practice, also a cause of action under § 301(a)(ii). S. REP. No. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 77
(1987).
135. Trade Act of 1974, § 301(3)(B)(i)(IIl), 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (amended 1988).
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1988 amendments to Section 301 as part of an indicative list of practic-
es to be considered "unreasonable" under Section 301(b).
To be actionable under the anticompetitive practices clause, a case
must involve government '"toleration" of business practices. These
practices must be "anticompetitive." A general provision of Section 301
would further require that the business practices in question burden U.S.
commerce.
1. Government Tolerance
The general terms of Section 301(b) designate as actionable the acts,
policies, or practices of a "foreign country." How then to address the
activities of private business? One of the bills tabled during the 1988
amendments would have simply broadened the scope of Section 301 to
include private anticompetitive behavior. This was, however, rejected as
too great a departure from the general spirit of Section 301, which is
designed to address intergovernmental problems. In particular, it was
difficult to countenance retaliating against a country for the behavior of
individuals within its borders, irrespective of whether the behavior was
government sanctioned.136 The solution was to implicate the responsibili-
ty of foreign governments for restrictive business practices through their
"toleration" of them. The Report of the Senate Finance Committee
(Senate Report) offers the rationale, stating that the amendment reflected
"the growing conviction ... that anti-competitive, market-restrictive
behavior on the part of private firms, when coupled with the failure of a
foreign government to intervene to eliminate such behavior, can act as a
barrier to market access which is as great as any formal government act,
policy, or practice alone."'
' 37
If government involvement could be inferred from the toleration of
just any anticompetitive behavior, the requirement of government tolera-
tion would be meaningless. The Senate Report, however, makes it clear
that there is some content to the requirement. The anticompetitive
practices clause is not intended to apply broadly to any and all purchas-
ing decisions by private firms.1 38 Toleration, according to the Senate
Report, must be of "pervasive or egregious activities ... which result in
a persistent pattern of restricted market access by U.S. firms in a partic-
136. Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A
Legislative History of the Amendment to Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra
note 9, at 49, 73-74.
137. S. REP. No. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1987).
138. Id.
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ular industry."'139 Under such circumstances, it would be difficult to
imagine that the government was unaware of the activity, and its failure
to intervene would seem to create a reasonable inference of complicity.
The principal consequence of the government toleration requirement
is to provide the USTR with a basis for refusing cases that acutely affect
petitioners but that are of little importance to the United States. This
effect of the government toleration requirement would, however, seem
to add little to the general requirement of burden on U.S. commerce dis-
cussed infra.
Perhaps the reference to a "particular industry" would work to rule
out a general claim by the USTR of lax antitrust enforcement. However,
it is this author's view that, since Section 301 is not subject to judicial
review,' 4° the quoted language and any but the most clear and broad
restraints on the scope of action under Section 301 should generally be
read as offering an excuse for inaction when the USTR decides that this
is prudent, rather than as a limitation on the USTR's range of discretion-
ary action.
2. The Standard of Anticompetitive Behavior
Section 301(b) refers to "systematic anticompetitive activities.''
What is the standard upon which the USTR must determine that activi-
ties are anticompetitive?
In the statute itself, there is no reference either to the antitrust rules
of the United States or to the rules of the locus of the offending activi-
ties. The statute seems, rather, to set its own standard, referring to
activities that are restrictive "on a basis that is inconsistent with com-
mercial considerations ....,, This standard, however, only tells us the
obvious, namely that restrictive business practices should not be con-
strued as anticompetitive when foreign companies are refusing to buy
U.S. products due to high prices or inferior quality.
Thus, a question remains as to which of the multitude of business
practices that subordinate immediate commercial interests to strategic
concerns are to be considered anticompetitive. The Senate Report offers
the extremely general example of "cartel-type behavior ... and closed
purchasing behavior ... that precludes or limits U.S. access in a con-
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See supra part II.A.i.a.
141. Trade Act of 1974, § 301(3)(B)(i)(III), 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
142. Id.
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certed and systematic way .... 143 Ultimately, both the legislative
history and the text of the statute fail to offer substantive criteria - sui
generis or by reference to other bodies of law, domestic or foreign.
Thus, the standard of anticompetitive behavior does not appear suscepti-
ble of rule-based construction.
The legislative history does, nevertheless, offer guidance of a gener-
al nature. On the one hand, the Senate Report insists that the purpose of
the clause is not to force U.S. concepts of antitrust law on foreign
governments.144 Rather, a "flexible approach" should be used, taking
into "account, among other things, whether the anti-competitive ...
activities are inconsistent with local (not U.S.) law; the flagrancy of the
activities; and the degree of the effect on U.S. commerce."' 145 On the
other hand, the Report of the House Ways and Means Committee
(House Report) mentions the need to give consideration to whether
opportunities in the foreign country generally reciprocate those available
in the United States."4 Consistency with local law is only one of several
non-exclusive factors mentioned in the Senate Report. In context, the
mention of local law seems to be made only in order to emphasize that,
if the USTR is to take into account existing antitrust rules, it should
look rather to rules of the country in which the conduct takes place and
not those of the United States.
In sum, the standard is not based on rules of conduct. Rather, it is
result-based, and results are gauged relatively. The test asks whether the
practices impede market access; and, if so, whether they impede market
access more than practices permitted in the United States impede access
to its market. The standard is one of rough reciprocity of competitive
conditions as they affect market access, not one of identity of rules
("mirror reciprocity"). 147
143. S. REP. No. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1987).
144. Id. at 86.
145. Id.
146. See H.R. REP. No. 100-40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1987) ("consideration should
be given to the denial by the foreign government of access to the market in that country and
opportunities within that market generally reciprocating those available in the United States").
147. In this respect, the standard is similar to one of the standards of Telecom 301, a
sector-specific version of Section 301. Section 1377(a)(2)(B) of that Act refers to acts,
policies, or practices of a country that deny "to telecommunications products and services of
United States firms mutually advantageous market opportunities" in the foreign country
subject to action. Note, however, that, unlike the anticompetitive practices clause of Section
301, this clause contemplates denial of opportunities "within the context of the terms" of an
existing agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Also, certain parts of the so-
called reciprocity clause of the European Union's Second Banking Directive use a similar
standard. See Council Directive 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1. In particular, the notion of
"comparable treatment" of art. 9(3) of the Second Banking Directive bears considerable
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This loose requirement of reciprocity is unworkable and unsatisfac-
tory as a legal standard. However, it serves well the needs of strategic
trade relations by foregoing the benefits of legal certainty in favor of
flexibility.148 One might object to such an imprecise standard because it
allows for arbitrary determinations. Yet arbitrariness only deserves a bad
name in the realm of relations between states and individuals. Sec-
tion 301 is outside of that realm, for it does not directly concern private
rights. It seeks to vindicate the state's interests, not those of individuals,
and the "defendants" are governments, not individuals. The lack of a
clear, objective standard is thus acceptable for the same reason that it is
permissible not to subject implementation of the standard to judicial
review: the standard is one for the political question, designed to guide
the judgment of the USTR through a political process, governed by
power relations among coequal branches of government and concerned
with similarly coequal relations between the United States and foreign
powers. 1
49
3. Burden on United States Commerce
Section 301(b) allows discretionary action only when a practice
"burdens or restricts United States commerce."'' 50 Consequently, this
requirement rules out any possibility of private petitioners embroiling
the United States in matters in which it has no real interest. This conse-
quence comports with the notion that, while individual petitioners may
resemblence to the reciprocity standard of the anticompetitive practices clause of Section 301.
Id. art. 9(3).
148. In seeming contradiction to this assertion, the Senate Report on the 1988 amend-
ments claims that they are motivated by the "perception that the Section 301 process needs to
be invested with a much greater degree of predictability and certainty .... S. REP. No. 167,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1987). However, certainty in this context actually refers more to
the desire to convey to foreign countries the impression that, when they do not comply with
requests, retaliation would be more certain under the new Section 301. The same paragraph of
the Report reveals this concern, lamenting the fact that "[o]ur trading partners do .not know
when the United States will act to enforce its international rights and when it will choose to
remain passive." Id. The actual result of the 1988 amendments was perhaps to convey the
impression of certain reprisal but not in fact to increase the certainty of reprisal. What the
1988 amendments actually did was to increase the likelihood of reprisal through various
mechanisms by placing political pressure on the USTR, while still leaving open to the USTR
the option to back down when reprisal would be, all things considered, not in the best interest
of the United States.
149. It would be another matter if the "defendant" were a foreign individual. On this,
and the analogy between the domestic political question and foreign policy matters, see
Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 2277 (framing the debate on whether U.S. courts should be
cognizant of international law in terms of a paradigm distinguishing traditional, horizontal
state-to-state international law issues and emerging, vertical state-individual transnational law
issues).
150. Trade Act of 1974, § 301(b), 19 U.S.C. 2411 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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be helpful in calling attention to trade restrictions, the purpose of Sec-
tion 301 is not to redress harm to them, but to further the general inter-
ests of the United States. 5'
4. Conclusion
The anticompetitive practices clause, like Section 301 in general,
can best be understood as a simultaneous effort to prod the USTR to
act, partly by enlisting the help of private petitioners while at the same
time not allowing the latter to hijack the process.
5 2
The language concerning restrictive business practices, as with most
of the 1988 amendments, 153 was designed to elicit action on the part of
the USTR, not restrict it. The addition of the anticompetitive clause
should be viewed in the overall context of the 1988 amendments, which
reflected the attitude in Congress that the Presidency was not being
aggressive enough in its use of Section 301.54 If the anticompetitive
practices clause were designed to limit the latitude for action by the
USTR, it would have made little sense to insert it as part of a list indic-
ative of "unreasonable" practices. Any meticulous analysis of what the
clause does not cover would seem superfluous in light of the fact that
matters not covered by it could still be construed as otherwise "unrea-
sonable."'' 55 The purpose of the new language inserted with the 1988
amendments was to put the spotlight on the issue of restrictive business
practices, thus applying some pressure on the USTR not to "overlook"
the matter. 156
151. Such a reading of the statute is also supported by the fact that its standing require-
ment is far more lenient than that of other trade statutes, requiring only that the petitioner be
an "interested person" and not necessarily directly harmed. And in practice, the USTR has not
required a showing of substantial injury before initiating negotiation. Konrad Blake Thatcher,
Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair Trade
Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 492, 502 (1987).
152. One commentator characterizes the role that Congress had in mind for the USTR
more cynically: "Statutes of this kind are a form of political bluster in which the Congress
overacts for domestic consumption, counting on the Executive to dilute the reality." Hudec,
supra note 122, at 122 n.13.
153. For instance, the requirements that the USTR draw up a list of priority countries
(§ 310(a)) and present a yearly report to Congress about the progress in negotiations with
these countries (§ 310(d)).
154. See S. REP. No. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1987) ("Along with [the] discretion
in determining what action to take has come the discretion to take no action. Too often U.S.
Presidents have opted to do nothing..
155. Indeed, the USTR had already brought a case that dealt in part with restrictive
business practices before the 1988 amendments. See infra part II.A.2.d.
156. See S. REP. No. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1987) ("The statute's enumeration
of actionable foreign acts, policies and practices, while intentionally broadly stated, may be so
broad as to permit an Administration to overlook situations that are within the scope of the
statute and ought to be investigated and remedied").
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. Thus, the restrictive elements of the anticompetitive practices clause
should be read as a substantive check on the private petitioner's case.
This would complement the procedural safeguards inherent in the whole
Section 301 process discussed in Part II.A.
C. Retaliation Under Section 301
1. The Political and Legal Constraints
of the World Trading System
It has been asserted above that the question of what is actionable
under Section 301 largely escapes legal scrutiny and is really a question
of political judgment for the USTR subject to "Congressional review."
This assertion is only partially true. As a matter of domestic law, the
Section 301 process is not subject to judicial review. Also, any interna-
tional law limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction are probably of no
concern because Section 301 is not, it has been argued here, an exercise
of prescriptive jurisdiction.157 However, international law and politics do
ultimately, constrain the use of Section 301 by limiting the latitude for
retaliation.
The international political constraints are simple yet considerable.
Coercion, as opposed to unilateral regulation, certainly has its advantag-
es from the standpoint of those countries subjected to the Section 301
process (flexibility and the possibility, ultimately, to say no). Yet de-
ploying Section 301 involves directly blaming a country and threatening
to punish it, if not actually retaliating. Except in special cases, this is
usually more offensive to a foreign government than blaming or punish-
ing one of its nationals would be. Thus, one writer has noted that,
"[i]ronically, detractors remark that Super 301 is 'too powerful' for
effective use among most U.S. allies or trade partners .... 58
International legal constraints exist because retaliation involves
restricting access to the U.S. market, and much of that access is now
granted to other countries under commitment. The terms of Section 301
do not require the USTR to respect international obligations.' 59 How-
157. See supra part II.A.2.e.
158. William A. Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Trade Policy, I TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP.
L. 135, 163 (1993). To the extent that countries have significant home markets, the risk of
counterretaliation is a strategic disadvantage. See Sykes, supra note 67, at 294 ("[a] bully is
more likely to sway the behavior of a weakling").
159. Nor does it require the USTR to violate them, given the possibility for cross-retalia-
tion. Cross-retaliation presumably allows the USTR to find some area where the United States
has no commitments. This way out might become increasingly theoretical given the increasing
breadth of coverage of the GATT MFN principle. See infra note 160. Compare this with
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ever, the USTR can be expected to avoid violation of trade agreements
for the reasons examined in the discussion of general traits supra Part
II.A.1. It is thus safe to say that the existence of U.S. trade commit-
ments will generally prevent retaliation in the committed area. To the
extent that such commitments prevent retaliation, they undermine the
credibility of the threat of retaliation and so limit the use of Section 301.
Thus, the increasing breadth of trade commitments undertaken by
the United States precludes retaliation in most areas. For instance, the
U.S. adherence to the most favored nation principle (MFN) in areas
covered by agreements undertaken within the framework of the World
Trade Organization substantially reduces the capacity for U.S. retalia-
tion.' 6° Congress specifically allows the USTR to take measures in
retaliation that breach the MFN principle. 16' However, this permission
should not be read as a general approval by Congress of MFN violation,
and there would most likely be little political pressure to take advantage
of it. The allowance for MFN violation has to be read in the context of
Section 301's connection to dispute settlement in the GATT and the
international law theory of "self-help" or the notion of "justified disobe-
dience."' 6 The USTR is required to request the opening of a GATT
panel when the practice under investigation involves a GATT agree-
§ 1382 of Telecom 301, which states that "[n]othing in this part may be construed to require
actions inconsistent with the international obligations of the United States, including the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." 19 U.S.C. § 3111 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
160. On the MFN principle and Section 301, see, e.g., OFFICE OF INT'L SECTOR POLICY,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AN EXAMINATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF U.S. TRADE LAWS As THEY
AFFECT THE COMPETITIVENESS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 33 (1983), cited in
Thatcher, supra note 151, at 517. A particularly striking example of the impact of the MFN
principle on the U.S.'s margin for retaliation is the effect of the MFN commitment under
GATS. This agreement establishes an ambitious framework for trade liberalization but is
modest in terms of immediate commitments to liberalize. Yet one of the few substantive
commitments is to grant MFN treatment with regard to all services. Art. II of the GATS
provides: "With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers
of any other country." General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Uruguay Round Final Act,
supra note 1, Annex IB, art. 11. Thus, however modest progress in trade liberalization turns
out to be in the service sector in years to come, the United States has already made a commit-
ment that in effect precludes retaliation in the entire sector. In this sense, the United States
has abandoned one potentially forceful means of liberalizing without at the same time
securing any degree of liberalization.
161. "The actions the Trade Representative is authorized to take ... may be taken
against any goods or economic sector- . . . (A) on a nondiscriminatory basis or solely
against the foreign country [subject to proceedings]." Trade Act of 1974, § 301(c)(3), 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1994) (emphasis added).
162. The latter notion has been suggested by Hudec, supra note 122, at 125-131. For an
explanation of the "self-help" theory, see ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL
REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES 4, 37-40, 67-68 (1984).
[Vol. 16:241
Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers
ment.163 If the panel does not find for the United States, further pursuit
of the matter is not mandatory.' 64 The provision allowing violation of
MFN echoes the provision of GATT dispute settlement allowing retalia-
tion when it is authorized pursuant to a favorable ruling. The only
difference is that Section 301 allows - and ostensibly requires -
retaliation where there is a favorable panel ruling but authorization is
blocked, i.e., it allows self-help when the GATT system acknowledges a
violation or denial of benefits but offers no relief. The self-help theory
probably no longer has any applicability in the case where there are
panel proceedings because it is based on the existence of a deficiency in
the GATT dispute settlement system, the possibility for the defendant to
block authorization of retaliation, that has since been remedied.165 If the
163. When an investigation "involves a trade agreement," the USTR is required to
"request proceedings on the matter under the formal dispute settlement procedures provided
under such agreement." 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (1994). At what point in an investigation will
practices that do not violate an agreement, but only "involve" it in the sense that there is
some colorable argument for nullification or impairment, require resort to GATT dispute
settlement? It is the author's view that, because the purpose of resorting to GATT panels is to
allow vindication of rights or benefits provided for by GATT without, in the process, actually
violating GATT, resorting to a GATT panel would only be necessary if the USTR plans to
retaliate in a manner that would violate GATT, absent authorization pursuant to the Under-
standing on Dispute Settlement. Note, however, that this reasoning addresses the question
whether U.S. law requires resort to GATT dispute settlement. Another matter altogether is
whether GATT law requires it. This would seem to be the case under the new Understanding
on Dispute Settlement. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, in Uruguay Round Final Act, supra note 1, Annex 2. As Andreas Lowenfeld notes,
"Article 23 of the Understanding ... states that when members seek redress of a violation of
the GATT or a related agreement, 'they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and
procedures of this Understanding,' and shall not make a determination that a violation has
occurred or that benefits have been nullified or unpaid, 'except through recourse to dispute
settlement in accordance with the ... Understanding.' " Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along
with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 481 (1994).
However, this does not clearly ban unilateral determinations and GAIT-legal retaliation in
cases that do not involve alleged violations or nullification and impairment of the GAIT or
related agreements. This might notably be the case of Section 301 proceedings dealing with
restrictive business practices.
164. This requirement of recourse to GATT probably serves, inter alia, to make sure that
any possibility of legal retaliation within the sphere of GAIT commitments will be known. At
first blush, another purpose seems to be to ensure that violation of GAIT is not mandatory.
Actually, it is not mandatory in any case because of the possibility for cross-retaliation
provided under § 301(c)(3). Nonetheless, the legally redundant loophole does serve two
political functions. First, it gives an overall impression of intending to comply with GATT,
thus mollifying foreign governments that might not be so finely attuned to the degree of
discretion that the USTR in fact has in terms of retaliation (indeed, part of the credibility of
the threat under Section 301 relies on their not being too aware of this discretion). Second,
the legally redundant loophole takes political pressure off the USTR to retaliate within the
sphere of GATT in the event of a negative ruling.
165. The new Understanding on Dispute Settlement does not allow one country to block
authorization to retaliate (withdraw concessions). Article 22(2) of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes provides that, failing compliance or
satisfactory compensation, "any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may
request authorization from the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] to suspend the application to
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self-help theory has no more applicability in the case of infringements
acknowledged by the GATT system through dispute settlement, it proba-
bly never had any applicability in the scenario discussed in this note
(i.e., where recourse is not made to dispute settlement and thus infringe-
ment or other nullification of an agreement has not been found by the
GATT system to be present).' 66 The conclusion is thus that Congress in
all likelihood did not intend the USTR to violate the MFN principle in
the type of case contemplated in this note. This will lend some strength
to the USTR's own GATT-compatible stance in the event of transitory
domestic political pressure to violate the MFN principle.
Therefore, when a successful case cannot be made before a GATT
panel, the effective use cf Section 301 is limited because the margin for
retaliation is limited. This margin will only decrease as the scope of
GATT and related agreements increases. This state of affairs is part of
what is, generally speaking, a good bargain: the latitude for unilateral
pursuit of gains has been restricted in return for a system that ensures
their effective pursuit within a multilateral framework. When private
trade barriers are considered, however, the compromise involved in this
bargain appears greater. Even though GATT coverage is broad and
expanding in terms of sectors (industrial goods, agricultural goods,
services, intellectual property protection), this coverage still applies
mainly to public barriers. Hence, the scope for retaliation not authorized
within the GATT is greatly reduced, but the private barriers potentially
attacked with Section 301 are not correspondingly reduced; the reduc-
tion in unilateral means of securing market liberalization has not been
matched with an increase in multilateral means to achieve the same
ends. The following section examines a failed attempt to correct this
discrepancy by tinkering with Section 301. Though the bill discussed
below will in all probability not become law, it warrants examination
because its inherent failings reveal just how difficult it is to circumvent
the constraints of the world trading system.
the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements."
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in Uruguay
Round Final Act, supra note 1, Annex 2, art. 22(2). Art. 22(6) then provides, in relevant part,
that "[w]hen the situation described in [Art. 22(2)] occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall grant
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the
reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request." Id. art.
22(6) (emphasis added). The previous situation whereby authorization was blocked absent
consensus has thus been reversed.
166. Furthermore, even if one considers a unilateral determination of nullification of
sufficient authority to justify disobedience, the cause of action considered in this paper -
toleration of restrictive business practices - makes it difficult to base retaliation on a
colorable claim of nullification.
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2. H.R. 4206: A Failed Attempt to Evade the
Constraints of the World Trading System
The observations in the preceding section reveal that Section 301
will be increasingly unable to deal with private barriers to market access
because Section 301 ultimately relies on the threat of raising barriers to
market access, a practice of which the world trading system is increas-
ingly intolerant. One solution to this problem is retaliation which does
not impede market access. H.R. 4206, a bill submitted to the House
Ways and Means Committee on April 13, 1994, inserted an additional
remedy whereby civil penalties would be imposed on "foreign or do-
mestic persons that engage in restrictive business practices ... when
such practices foreclose United States exports or otherwise burden or
restrict United States foreign commerce."'' 67 The President would have
been empowered to levy civil penalties against the U.S. business opera-
tions of the offending company.
68
By shifting retaliation from governments to businesses, the bill
would seem to generally have escaped the purview of the GATT or the
analogous agreement on services. Neither forced compliance nor imposi-
tion of fines would constitute a barrier to trade in goods or services with
the United States. 6 9 Nor would the bill have restricted the activities of
service providers within the U.S. market. Rather, it would have pre-
scribed conduct of businesses operating outside of the United States.
However egregious this remedy might have been, it would have escaped
the constraints of GATT just as surely as does the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. antitrust laws.
H.R. 4206 was in essence a clever hybrid of the antitrust and Sec-
tion 301 remedies. On the one hand, it was free of the constraints posed
by trade commitments because retaliation was to be against businesses
instead of governments. On the other hand, it might also have gotten
around the substantive deficiencies of U.S. antitrust law, because the
standards applied by the President under Section 301 would not neces-
167. The insertion would have been entitled "Section 311. Action by the President to
Open Foreign Markets." Presumably, it would have been inserted into the 1974 Trade Act
after §§ 301-310, which comprise the so-called Section 301, and it would have been part of
the amendments under the "Gatt Fair Trade Enforcement Act of 1994," to implement the
results of the Uruguay Round. The bill was presented at the 103d Congress, 2d session of the
House of Representatives by Congressman Regula (for himself and Congressman Mineta) on
April 13, 1994. See H.R. 4206, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
168. Id. § 311(e).
169. It would probably stretch the limits of the prohibition in art. III of the GATT to
argue that the fines imposed under an amended Section 301 would "afford protection to
domestic production."
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sarily have to follow those developed by the U.S. courts in the antitrust
context. 70 Also, by retaining the procedural aspects of Section 301, use
of the remedy would have been kept well within the control of govern-
ment, precluding the possibility of imprudent private suits.
Though H.R. 4206 appeared to solve many problems, it did not
appear in the House Ways and Means Committee bill for implementa-
tion of the Uruguay Round of GATT. The author is not aware of the
reasons for its rejection. One explanation is that lawmakers realized the
hybrid involved in the H.R. 4206 proposal imported some defective
traits from the antitrust remedy along with the good ones. By providing
for retaliation against individuals, the bill would have fundamentally
transformed the Section 301 process in two respects.
First, directly sanctioning the businesses engaged in restrictive
business practices as opposed to sanctioning their host government
would probably introduce the international law issue of prescriptive
jurisdiction. The President would be penalizing certain behavior in
another country. As the home country of the offending business would
no longer act as an intermediary to implement the will of the United
States, the argument that this was simply a modification of behavior
pursuant to the normal political relations between two states would no
longer be valid.' 7' As will be seen in part III of this note, extraterritorial
jurisdiction would be difficult to justify in cases dealing purely with
problems of access to one country's market.
Second, because "defendants" would be individuals, it seems likely
that determinations would be subject to judicial review. 72 Introduction
of judicial review would detract from the flexibility that is so essential
to use of the Section 301 process as an instrument of foreign relations.
Also, judicial review might render less probable the potential disjunction
between the substantive standards used under Section 301 and those
developed by the courts under U.S. antitrust law mentioned above; the
U.S. courts might be reluctant to apply a double standard.
170. On the substantive deficiencies of U.S. antitrust law as a remedy to private trade
barriers, see supra I.A.2.
171. See supra part lI.A.2.e (arguing that the rules on prescription jurisdiction do not
apply to Section 301).
172. Indeed, the statute itself might come under fire for failing to meet due process
requirements. In particular, procedural aspects linked to the absence of a real possibility to
defend except through diplomatic representations could be held unconstitutional. Constitution-
al limitations might even .apply to the matter of prescriptive jurisdiction. On the issue of
whether the Constitution does/should control prescriptive jurisdiction, see Brilmayer &
Norchi, supra note 19 (arguing that there may be constitutional limitations imposed by the
due process clause); Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A
Comment on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1987)
(offering reasons why the courts have not and should not bring the Constitution to bear on the
issue of prescriptive jurisdiction).
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D. The Limited Experience with the Anticompetitive
Practices Clause of Section 301
The political nature of the Section 301 process suggests that experi-
ence, rather than meticulous legal analysis, is likely to be the best
indicator of the efficacy of its anticompetitive practices clause. Disap-
pointingly for the empiricist, though, the experience with the use of
Section 301 against private barriers to market access is extremely lim-
ited.
The only case brought exclusively, against private barriers was
withdrawn by the petitioners. 173 The case involved a Japanese car manu-
facturer which charged higher prices on spare parts sold to suppliers that
were not its designated car dealers. 74 Thus, oddly for a Section 301
petition, the complaint was in essence aimed against restraints on im-
ports into the United States. Petitioner, the Auto International Associa-
tion, first took the case to the DOJ, which did not hesitate to decide that
the vertical restriction involved did not violate antitrust law. The Associ-
ation then filed a petition with the USTR, which it withdrew soon
thereafter.
In another case, grievances concerning business practices were filed
together with complaints concerning state activity. 175 The petition sought
mainly to eliminate strategic trade barriers 176 in the Japanese semicon-
ductor sector, but it also complained of lax enforcement of Japanese
antitrust law regarding cartels. This lack of enforcement combined with
publicly maintained strategic trade barriers apparently allowed the
Japanese industry to fix prices on the domestic market impervious to
foreign competition, permitting producers to finance exports at "unfair-
ly" low prices. The USTR took up the private as well as public aspects
of the complaint and the settlement partially addressed the private
aspects. 177 The private aspects of the complaint thus were "piggy-
173. Japan Auto Parts (P-21), Office of the United States Trade Representative Section
301 Table of Cases 3 (Apr. 1, 1994) (filed May 9, 1988; withdrawn June 30, 1988) (on file
with author).
174. The car manufacturer also allegedly flatly refused to sell to suppliers in some
instances. Id.
175. Japan Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (1987).
176. That is, "various forms of national industrial policies designed to direct resources
toward certain sectors in order to achieve national objectives." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, MARKET ACCESS IN JAPAN: THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE 8-9 (No. 85-37,
1985), cited in Thatcher, supra note 151, at 528 n.258.
177. Japan was to monitor the cost and prices of chips exported to the United States, and
Japanese manufacturers were to submit cost and price data to MITI. U.S., Japan Reach Five-
Year Deal on Chips, Administration Dropping Dumping, § 301 Cases, [3 Current Reports]
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backed" onto the public aspects, but the USTR decision to address the
pricing issues indicates that it had not excluded private barriers from its
agenda. Moreover, the proceedings took place in 1985-86. With the
advent of the anticompetitive practices clause under the 1988 amend-
ments to Section 301, the USTR should only be more receptive to
complaints concerning government toleration of restrictive business
practices - this said with the ever present general caveat that the
prevailing political climate will be more determinate than most statutory
language under the Section 301 regime.
While the USTR seems to be amenable to pursuing cases involving
restrictive business practices, one cannot help but note that neither of the
two cases discussed above raise issues of private conduct impeding
access to a foreign market. The Auto Parts case involved activities
which restricted exports to the U.S. market. The Semiconductor case, on
the other hand, involved the combination of public trade barriers and
private collusive behavior often associated with the problem of dump-
ing." 8 Though the strategic trade barriers involved in that case may have
impeded U.S. exports to Japan, if these public barriers were to be re-
moved, the type of restrictive business practice at issue would actually
be a boon to U.S. exporters, who would easily enter the market by
underselling the cartel.
Thus, remarkably in the Section 301 experience, there have been no
petitions alleging that restrictive business practices constitute barriers to
a foreign market. This suggests that there is no substantial problem.
Alternatively, it may suggest that firms are in fact encountering signifi-
cant private trade barriers but see the Section 301 remedy as inadequate
and not worth the costs of a petition. There could be a number of rea-
sons for this, all linked with the political nature of Section 301. First,
potential petitioners often contact the USTR before formally petitioning
to find out whether their case will receive sympathetic attention and are
often told that it will not. Second, a petition is an inherently risky
investment. Though the costs of a Section 301 petition are probably far
less than the costs of the discovery phase of an antitrust suit, it would
rarely be possible to initiate a petition with any certainty that the politi-
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 32, at 994 (Aug. 6, 1986), cited in Thatcher, supra note 151,
at 533 n.288.
178. See, e.g., Antitrust Solutions Urged for U.S. Steel Makers' Trade Woes, 10 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1674 (June 1993) (describing allegations that cartel activity in Europe and
the far-east and market allocation between those two regions were permitting businesses to
finance dumping into the United States). On the link between dumping and restrictive
business practices, see Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, Antitrust-Based Remedies and
Dumping in International Trade (Paper prepared for the Fifth Global Contributions Seminar,
June 12-17, 1994, Tokyo).
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cal winds will not shift after filing and investigation, causing the USTR
to drop the case. Finally, petitioners cannot be sure what type of relief
they will get from a settlement, and they have no great assurance that a
settlement will be scrupulously honored by the country against which
proceedings were brought.It should be stressed, however, that it is no shortcoming that, be-
cause of the USTR's unresponsiveness, Section 301 does not fulfill the
needs of private petitioners. The statute is designed to serve global
United States interests, and as an instrument of trade law - a compo-
nent of foreign policy - it should be. The observations made above
simply suggest that the number of private petitions concerning private
trade barriers is not necessarily an accurate barometer of American
businesses' perception of their importance.
III. CONTROLLING THE ANTITRUST OPTION: A PROPOSAL FOR
JURISDICTIONAL SELF-RESTRAINT
The previous parts of this note have been concerned with the feasi-
bility of Section 301 and the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law as remedies for private trade barriers. Having concluded that both
remedies have their limitations but may offer some relief, it makes sense
to turn to the broader implications of their use - where would these
two remedies lead us if used with some frequency? Given past experi-
ences with international trade regulation and with the extraterritorial
application of antitrust law, it seems probable that one concern should
be that the chickens will come home to roost. 7 9 Thus, the following two
sections will be inspired by a version of the Golden Rule: Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you, because they are bound to
reciprocate, sooner or later. While Section 301 does not look trouble-
some in this perspective, the antitrust option does. Some explanation of
179. For instance, Prof. Jackson notes that, while "the United States, the EC, Canada,
and Australia ... account for the vast majority of antidumping cases brought in the world ...
there are some signs that other countries are 'learning the game.' " JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 228
(1989). In his course, The Law of International Trade and Economic Relations, he notes the
tendency for other countries to follow the protectionist examples of the United States,
suggesting that the latter should keep in mind when formulating foreign trade standards what
it would be like to be subject to them. As to the extraterritorial application of antitrust law,
the effects doctrine, first announced by Judge Learned Hand in the 1945 Alcoa case (see
supra part I.A.1), is now in substance followed by some of the U.S.'s major trading partners,
most notably the European Union. See Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust Law: The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L.
1 (1992). The reach of German antitrust law governing mergers is said to be arguably longer
than that of the United States. David J. Gerber, The Extraterritorial Application of German
Antitrust Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756, 757 (1984).
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this is given below. The following section suggests how to address these
concerns regarding the antitrust option.
A. The Need for Self-Restraint
Assuming arguendo that "aggressive unilateralism" is poor trade
policy, Section 301 is still not likely to do much damage, given the
internal and external constraints tempering its use. The discretionary
control of the USTR, a generally prudent and trade-friendly administra-
tor, offers an internal constraint. 80 The external constraints are the
political costs of blaming and punishing, or threatening to punish,
foreign powers, and the increasingly limited scope for GATT consistent
retaliation under Section 301. These same external constraints also offer
assurance that major trading partners inclined to surpass the United
States in aggressive unilateralism of the Section 301 type would be at
pains to do so. Therefore, the United States is not likely to set an exam-
ple that we would fear to see followed or embellished on, and thus,
there is no urgent need to define the scope of action under the
anticompetitive practices clause of Section 301.'81
The scope of the antitrust remedy, by contrast, needs to be defined
more clearly. This is because it is less constrained than Section 301. The
internal constraints on antitrust extraterritorial jurisdiction are, as of yet,
not clearly defined, and international law offers virtually no external
constraints. One might at first object that an internal constraint is offered
by the limitations that the legislature and the courts place on the reach
of the antitrust laws - the effects test and the inclination of some
courts to factor in considerations of international comity. However,
when one combines the tendency of courts not to dismiss cases, de-
scribed supra I.A.l.b, with the fact that cases may be pursued through
the court system by individuals independently of government agencies,
the antitrust remedy begins to make Section 301 look tame by compari-
son. As to the external constraints of international law, there are no
treaty obligations regarding jurisdiction to prescribe antitrust law, and
customary international law is not delimiting. 82 Moreover, even if there
180. See supra part II.A.
181. Moreover, the lack of judicial review makes it a somewhat futile task. Two authors,
at least, have attempted definition. See David M. Pedley, A Definition for "Unreasonable" in
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Consideration of the United States-Thailand Tobacco
Dispute, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 285 (1991); Patricia I. Hanson, Defining Unreasonableness
in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987).
182. See, e.g., Don Wallace, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1099, 1100 (1983).
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were clear and accepted rules, the framework and the incentive to en-
force them are lacking.
8 3
The antitrust remedy is therefore troubling in several respects. First,
it is unclear just how outrageous U.S. suits will become because private
treble damages suits are a wild card. Second, the confines of the exam-
ple we would be setting appear so ill-defined that reactions would be
even less predictable than our own actions. For instance, assuming that
Keiretsu behavior abroad proved, after all, to be vulnerable to U.S.
antitrust theories and courts admitted jurisdiction, it would be difficult to
object on jurisdictional grounds if a politically confident Japan ten to
twenty years down the road were to bring cases against companies oper-
ating in the United States on the theory that adherence to certain self-
imposed technical standards constitutes an illicit exclusionary practice.
The following is an approach to prescriptive jurisdiction designed to
avoid such an unhappy development by better defining our own extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, not 'as a matter of conformity with international law,
but as a matter of self-restraint.
B. A Tentative Formula for Self-Restraint: Protective Jurisdiction
After extensively surveying cases in which conflict arose over the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, Karl Meessen in 1984
concluded that (a) "[a]ll attempts to identify simple criteria [i.e. connect-
ing factors, such as locus of conduct or effect, and passive or active
personality] for determining the situations in which antitrust conflicts
arise have failed;" and (b), the "crux of the matter is adverse effect on
foreign interests."' 184 Implicit in these conclusions is the suggestion that
the existence of a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is not
an issue and that concern must be directed to reasonableness in the
exercise of jurisdiction, giving due consideration to the impact in any
case on the specific' interests of other states. The dilemma, as Meessen
saw it, was thus mainly not one of the legitimacy of the basis of juris-
diction, but of reconciling cases of legitimate, concurrent jurisdiction.
This led him to suggest a broad rule of "enlightened self-interest" re-
garding the basis of jurisdiction and a more "trenchant" rule on the
183. Unlike trade retaliation, extraterritorial application of U.S. law in the sense dis-
cussed in this note could not be subject to a GATT panel (i.e., there is no framework for
enforcement). And the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws do not, unlike GATT-illegal
trade retaliation, undermine a system in which the *major trading partners have invested a
great deal (i.e., there is no incentive to enforce).
184. Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 794 (1984). See also id. at 800 (arguing that no specific connecting
factor, or set of such factors, appears to be regarded as binding).
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exercise of jurisdiction that would emerge with practice, as states en-
gaged in interest balancing to avoid undesired conflicts. 8 5 The emphasis
of Meessen and others on interest balancing, rather than on the legitima-
cy of the jurisdictional basis, was sensible because they had observed
that the flash points often involved cases where the basis of jurisdiction
was not in doubt. 86 The suggestions that will follow, however, arise
from the realization that the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction might
not always be legitimate, particularly where jurisdiction is over foreign
conduct that restrains U.S. exports.
Without calling into question the effects doctrine as a basis of
jurisdiction, the proposition asserted here is that the extraterritorial
application of antitrust law based on that doctrine, when used to elimi-
nate market access barriers, might often exceed the bounds of legitimate
jurisdiction because it will tend to be aggressive, rather than protective.
To illustrate this point, consider an extreme case. Imagine a hypo-
thetical suit against a company engaging in Keiretsu exclusive dealing.
Once an antitrust violation is proven, the United States would then apply
its laws essentially for the purpose of better exploiting another country's
market. It is important to stress that, even though the United States
might gain more by applying its laws to open Japanese markets than
Japan might lose as a result of U.S. intervention, this case would offend
our international sensibilities. This is because, regardless of the relative
weights of U.S. and Japanese interests, the purpose of U.S. intervention
does not strike us as a legitimate basis for jurisdiction. After all, what
right does the United States have to regulate unilaterally another coun-
try's market on the sole justification that it would benefit by exploiting
that market. Such a ground for jurisdiction would seem to offend even
the most relative notions of sovereign equality and noninterference.
It is argued here that jurisdiction used for aggressive purposes
departs from the effects doctrine as we know it. Attorney General
185. Id. at 801. Meessen's view of balancing interests as a matter of customary interna-
tional law differs from the Restatement (Third) in that it would include only factors that
reflect the concerns of states, leaving private conflicts analysis to domestic law. Meessen's
view differs from the position of the Timberlane and Mannington Mills courts in that it does
not necessarily require that the judiciary engage in balancing, as long as the conduct of the
state conforms. For the proposition that the political branches are capable of ensuring this, see
Garvey, supra note 36.
186. Lloyd Cutler in 1984 noted in this regard that "[t]he problem is that world econom-
ic activity is now so interdependent that the effects principle, and the same can be said for the
territoriality principle and for the nationality principle, can confer regulatory jurisdiction, very
plausible regulatory jurisdiction, on two or more sovereigns .... Lloyd Cutler, Restrictive
Business Practices or Anti-trust: 'Effects' Doctrine and Territorial Approach. US Concepts, in
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 70, 71 (Cecil J.
Olmstead ed., 1984).
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Griffin Bell, in an address to Australians in 1978, speaks implicitly to
the notion that the effects doctrine is based on a protective notion of
jurisdiction:
[R]ight from the beginning, our government concluded that if you
never applied the antitrust laws to persons or actions located out-
side your territory, the result will be that the values of others...
will be forced upon us in our territory. We... assert [jurisdiction]
to promote the significant United States interest in maintaining
competition in United States markets.'87
Given the current level of global economic interdependence, it is
unrealistic to speak of foreign values being forced on U.S. businesses in
U.S. territory. Even the notion of U.S. markets would quickly become
elusive in any concrete set of circumstances involving business conduct
abroad. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to maintain the notion of protec-
tion in the rationale underpinning effects based jurisdiction. Indications
of how to do this effectively are offered in United States practice,
particularly the Pilkington Consent Decree.
88
It is probably no coincidence that the DOJ, when it rescinded foot-
note 159 of their 1988 International Guidelines, chose to state that its
aim was to "protect" export opportunities, rather than, for instance, to
"enhance" them. 189 The problem is that the DOJ formula offers no
means to distinguish between protective and aggressive purposes. DOJ
practice, on the other hand, suggests a sharper definition. The Pilkington
Consent Decree involved licensing restrictions that precluded U.S. ex-
ports, not to a specific country, but to any country.' 9° In this case, then,
it is possible to construe DOJ action as protecting the general ability to
export. This can be distinguished from action to secure exports to a
particular country when the anticompetitive conduct is within that
country. In this latter case, the "effects" outside of its territory are no
greater than the effects of directly regulating entry to the market through
government measures. Thus, unilateral regulation seems inappropriate.' 9'
For when a government is tolerating practices that bar access to its own
market, this is certainly an integral part of its trade policy.
187. United States Attorney General Griffin Bell, Address to the Law Council of
Australia (July 17, 1978), in ALAN V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNO-
TATED COLLECTION OF MATERIALS 1, 4-5 (1983).
188. See Consent Decree, supra note 6, at 30,604.
189. DOJ Policy, supra note 6, at 1.
190. Pilkington Complaint, supra note 109, at 8-9.
191. See introductory remarks supra part II.
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The rule. Thus, the rule would be that foreign conduct that generally
blocks exports, or that blocks access to only one market, is fair game
for U.S. antitrust laws, provided that the offending conduct takes place
outside of the country whose market is targeted for trade.
The rationale. As with general application of the effects doctrine for
protection against harm from imports, this version would naturally
require a significant effect on U.S. commerce. However, an additional
requirement, centering on the purpose of asserting U.S. jurisdiction, is
necessary in cases concerning export opportunities because there are
numerous cases in which the magnitude of the estimated effect of being
kept out of some potential market is great. Yet, the magnitude of the
potential gain is inadequate to provide a legitimate basis for extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. Thus, it is necessary to insist that the purpose of the
jurisdiction be legitimate. It is asserted that (a) extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion in the economic context must be protective in nature to be legiti-
mate; and (b) in the normal course of trade relations, it can hardly be
maintained that acting to secure entry to a particular market against the
will of a country having territorial jurisdiction over that market is an act
of protection. Thus, the operative rule is that the legitimacy of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law to protect export oppor-
tunities depends on whether or not the anticompetitive practices limited
to one market must be seen as part of the sovereign's prerogative to
deny access to its market; or whether the practices deny access to other
markets as well, in which case they may more readily be seen to pro-
vide a legitimate basis for protective action. This would mean, for
instance, that jurisdiction could be legitimate in a case such as
Pilkington (involving territorial restrictions enforced through the exclu-
sive licensing agreements of a U.K. company), where access to markets
other than that of the United Kingdom was being impeded by the re-
strictive practices.
192
The exception. The rule stated above comports thus far with post-
1992 DOJ and court practice, but it does not, unfortunately, accommo-
date certain previous practices, namely suits aimed at Japanese buyers'
cartels and boycotts. 193 Nor does it comport with certain illustrative
192. The rule would seem generally to have the practical effect of allowing extraterrito-
rial antitrust jurisdiction to protect export opportunities when exporters are being restrained by
contract. It is difficult to imagine that the restrictive effects of a business arrangement could
affect exports by third parties outside of the national market in which the restrictive arrange-
ments are in effect.
193. The DOJ has cited boycotts and buyers' cartels as targets twice since 1982. See
Itoh, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010; Daishowa, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774.
Note that Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 100, a case often cited by the DOJ, involves no such ag-
gressive behavior on the part of the defendant. However, the defendant was, significantly, a
[Vol. 16:241
Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers
examples of the 1994 Draft Guidelines for International Operations. 94
Nevertheless, it should be possible to carve out an accommodating
exception to the rule stated in the preceding paragraphs. Such an excep-
tion might say that restrictive business practices that can only be con-
strued as aggressive and lacking any internal justification - i.e., practic-
es that would make no sense if they were not intended to exploit or
harm the plaintiff - offer a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction even if
carried out in the country targeted for exports. This exception to the
operative rule is still reasonably consistent with the general premise of
protective action because it is a reaction to aggressive behavior. Further-
more, the reaction itself would be aggressive only with respect to the
defendants and not to any implicit structural policy of the host govern-
ment. To the extent that the government is involved, for example
through some type of strategic use of a boycott or buyers' cartel, the
government compulsion defense is likely to preclude relief anyway. This
exception to the rule appears safe because it would mean that extraterri-
torial application of law would still be impermissible when it seeks
essentially to cure perceived structural impediments, as opposed to
discreet incidents of targeted behavior. This is important from the per-
spective of trying to provide an example that, if followed by other
countries, avoids the possibility that-the United States market would be
regulated in a way fundamentally at odds with the American idea of
what is good for the domestic market.
PROPOSALS
The following is a thumb-nail sketch of how the conclusions
reached in this note would suggest that U.S. unilateral policy might
unfold and interact with relevant multilateral and bilateral processes.
A. The Antitrust Remedy: Clarify the Outer Limits
of Government Enforcement Policy
Part III suggested a principled formula allowing the U.S. enforce-
ment agencies to eschew cases against private barriers to. foreign mar-
kets when such cases would involve an aggressive assertion of jurisdic-
tion. Implementing the formula should not be too difficult because both
U.S. company. Meessen's survey revealed that, in all but one case, there have been objections
to the extraterritorial application of antitrust law only when claims are directed against foreign
firms. Meessen, supra note 184, at 793.
194. Draft Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 7, at 52,816-17 (illustra-
tive examples C and F); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text. Moreover, 1992
DOJ policy statements specifically allude to group boycotts. See DOJ Policy, supra note 6.
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current and past practice appear well within the bounds it prescribes. To
borrow from trade-law terminology, the theories call for "standstill," not
"rollback." Even if the courts do not explicitly embrace such a formula,
sufficiently explicit manifestations of enforcement agency policy could
be adequate in their impact on private litigation. 95 If the self-imposed
norm is sufficiently clear, it would not only help to ensure that the
United States sets the right example by its actions; it would also serve
to avoid misconstruction by foreign powers of the limits of the example
set.
B. Section 301 and Other Government-to-Government Remedies
Section 301 has the potential to pick up where the antitrust remedy
leaves off, dealing with those trade-restrictive business practices that are
ruled out as subjects of antitrust suits under the theory set out in Part
III. Section 301 could also operate when the government compulsion de-
fense precludes a successful antitrust suit. As Part II demonstrated, Sec-
tion 301 cannot be used at will and so cannot perfectly complement the
antitrust remedy. However, use of Section 301 should be conceived of
as part of a broader range of government-to-government means of
eliminating private trade barriers. The proposal here is to use and im-
prove the government-to-government channels currently available.
Use the available coercive remedies. In addition to the unilateral
approach of Section 301, there may be a multilateral coercive remedy.
The authors who have most closely examined the option of taking
private barriers to a GATT panel conclude that some active forms of
government support for such barriers are already inconsistent with
GATT and as such can be attacked as prima facie cases of nullification
or impairment.' 96 They also conclude that nonviolation cases involving
private trade barriers may, under some circumstances, be successful
under current GATT law. They remark, however, that this "potentially
powerful tool ... has not yet been put to the test."'97 Use of this option,
they suggest, would, if nothing else, help to identify where the problems
lie.
Negotiate to eliminate identified barriers. Synergy is possible be-
tween the process of identification that may occur through use of the
coercive remedy of Section 301 and the use of solutions based on
195. See supra part I.B.1 (discussing the importance of government enforcement policy).
196. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Competition, Competition Policy and
the GAT, 17 WORLD ECON. 121, 148 (1994).
197. Id.
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mutual benefit, i.e., trade agreements. Even where the coercive remedy
is unsuccessful (negotiations are unsuccessful and the case is lost in
GATT or there is no means of GATT consistent retaliation under Sec-
tion 301), recourse to the remedy will still serve to identify the barriers.
This could lead to renewed efforts to negotiate a solution, not as a
matter of vindicating what is already owed to the United States, but
rather through the enticement of reciprocal concessions. For example, it
may turn out upon closer inspection that vertical restrictions in the
Japanese car market could be circumvented without too much cost by
setting up our own dealerships.' 9 However, it may be prohibitively
expensive to establish a distributorship in Japan because of the need for
a compulsory deposit. While such a barrier is not prohibited by the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, the United States, having
identified it as a major barrier to Japan's car market, would certainly
push hard to have Japan include removal of the requirement as a specif-
ic commitment under the market access provision of that Agreement. In
future negotiations, whatever Japan's reasons for a compulsory deposit,
these arguments would have to have sufficient political weight to justify
keeping the U.S. auto industry out of its market.
The above example illustrates the forceful effect' of identifying
obstacles.' 99 It also suggests that we should look twice to be sure wheth-
er many problems can be boiled down to traditional regulatory issues for
which the multilateral system is already equipped, rather than contem-
plating the possibility of harmonizing competition law or attacking
private barriers coercively. 200 Furthermore, identifying obstacles may
lead to the conclusion that certain perceived barriers related to restrictive
business practices can be alleviated, not by harmonizing but through an
agreement that assures mutual, but not necessarily identical, adjustment
in competition policy to improve market access.2°' In particular, the
issue of enforcement lends itself to negotiated solutions without under-
198. This was the suggestion of Aaditya Mattoo, member of the Economic Research and
Analysis Unit of the GATT. Interview with Aaditya Mattoo, Member, Economic Research
and Analysis Unit of GATT, in Geneva, Switzerland.
199. This process is institutionalized by the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Professor
Jackson suggests this as one of the avenues offered by GATT to confront the new problems
posed by restrictive business practices. John H. Jackson, Alternative Approaches for Imple-
menting Competition Rules in International Economic Relations 17 (draft of November 10,
1993) (on file with author).
200. For a discussion of Japan's Large Retail Store law, see Saxonhouse, supra note 66,
at 467.
201. For a different view on this matter, see Phedon Nicolaides, Towards Multilateral
Rules on Competition. The Problems in Mutual Recognition of National Rules, WORLD
COMPETMON, March 1994, at 5.
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taking harmonization. An agreement to enforce could also contain
reference to the use of arbitration under the GATT Understanding on
Dispute Settlement.
Improve the coercive remedies. There will always be private barriers
that are so fluid that they cannot be identified early and negotiated
away. Furthermore, the United States may ultimately confront the prob-
lem that its market contains so few restrictions that it has nothing to
offer at the negotiating table in order to gain concessions. Where the
avenue of reciprocal concessions leads to naught, this failure may push
lawmakers to improve the coercive remedies. Congress may modify
Section 301 to put even more pressure on the USTR to act, for instance
by citing specific types of anticompetitive practices or heightening
political exposure through yet more procedural modifications. If Sec-
tion 301 turns out to be a dead end because of decreasing margins for
GATT consistent retaliation, the United States could then push to move
with other countries to change the terms of reference of dispute settle-
ment within the GATT, or perhaps even change some of the substantive
ground rules.
This scheme -. which is not so much a plan as a description of
what should naturally occur - will filter out insignificant problems and
identify significant ones. The process of identification will in turn
channel political awareness, both domestic and foreign, to the right
places, thus marshaling the political capital needed to achieve the com-
promises necessary to solve the most pernicious problems. It is probably
a safe bet that there will not be much left in the way of unaddressed
obstructions at the end of this process - certainly none that merit the
long-term costs of aggressive extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law.
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